

Tuomo Aho

Mitä logiikka ei koske

Lienee pakko sanoa, että kielellinen elementti *merkitsee* jotain ei-kielellistä; tätä tuskin voi selittää. Aloitetaan yksinkertaisuuden vuoksi lauseloogisista kielistä.

Olkoon kielen lauseiden joukko S . Lauseilla olkoon (vähintään mahdollinen) totuusarvojakauma. Kaikki kuvaukset $S^n \rightarrow S$ ovat (n -paikkaisia) *operaatioita*. Muutamille operaatioille annetaan oma nimi/symboli. Silloin symbolikin merkitsee jotain. Tällaisia ovat esim. ns. *konnektiivit* (n -paikkaiset). Esim. jos s_i merkitsee että asia on niin että p_i , niin $v(s_1, s_2) = (s_1 \vee s_2)$ merkitsee, että tosiasia on p_1 tai p_2 .

Ei-atomisilla lauseilla voi olla yleispäteviä suhteita; esimerkiksi ne ovat ehkä loogisia totuuksia. Semmoiset ovat voimassa eräiden erikoisten operaattoriensa, ns. *loogisten* elementtien vuoksi (Buridan, Bolzano). Niiden määrittely on klassinen ongelma (Tarski) – ei nim. ole mitään ilmeistä kriteerejä sitä varten. Mutta huomattakoon joka tapauksessa, että ko. looginen suhde edellyttää asianomaiset säännönmukaiset yhteydet vastaavien merkitysten kesken – muutenhan loog. totuudella olisi epätosi instanssi. Logiikka ei sano mitään lauseiden ei-loogisista sisällöistä, vaan antaa ainoastaan säännönmukaisuuksia, jotka johtuvat loogista elementeistä.

Mutta miten saadaan selville jokin looginen totuus? Kaikkia instansseja ei voi käydä läpi. Siis loogisten totuuksien löytämiseksi, ilmaisemiseksi jne. on välttämätöntä siirtyä *metakieleen*. Asia liittyy myös probleemaan, jota klassikot ovat eri syistä pohtineet vain vähän: mitä logiikka oikeastaan koskee, tai mikä on sen aihepiiri (*subjectum*)? Näköjään se on kyseisen kielen metakieli (Zabarella). Sen sijaan että käsiteltäisiin lauseita $s_i \in S$, loogikko antaa metakielen lauseita A, B, \dots , jotka sitten esiintyvät erilaisissa skeemoissa. Eräät skeemat todetaan universaalisesti päteviksi (kuten voidaan näyttää sekä semanttista että syntaktista tietä). Tämäkin pätevyys vallitsee merkitysten johdosta.

Lauseissa on (voi olla) muukin rakenteellinen näkökohta. Niissä voi olla mukana myös *modaalinen* operaattori. Esimerkiksi operaattori $N: S \rightarrow S$ muodostaa lauseen Ns , joka merkitsee, että *välttämättä* on p . Os taas merkitsee, että *pitäisi* olla niin että p . On tapana sanoa, että N on aleellinen (aletheia) ja O deonttinen modaaliteetti. (Se on oikeastaan väärin: N on anankeettinen, ja todella aleellinen on se T , jolla Ts merkitsee että todella on p .) En ole vakuuttunut, että aitoja loogisia modaaliteetteja on muita kuin nämä kolme. Kieliopistahan muistamme, että lauseen modukset vastaavat niitä *tapoja*, joilla lause on voimassa.

Huomioista seuraa muutamia johtopäätöksiä. Modaaliset operaattorit ja niiden lait kuuluvat tunnetusti ns. *modaalilogiikan* alueeseen. Aihe on ikivanha (Aristoteles), mutta sitä ei ole juuri yritettykään määrittellä. Tämä määrittelytehtävä on tullut entistä aktuellimmaksi, kun kaikenlaisia uusia ehdotuksia on tarjottu tulokkaiksi modaalilogiikan piiriin. Luultavasti kuuluisin näistä logiikkaehdokkaista on niin sanottu ”propositionaalisten asenteiden logiikka”, jolla lienee vieläkin paljon vaikutusta. Ko. ”logiikan” ajatuksenahan on, että lause alistetaan asennepredikaatille; esimerkiksi $B_a s$ merkitsee, että subjekti a uskoo lauseen s merkityksen. Vastaavasti oletetaan kaikille subjekteille ja asenteille (joskaan ei kerrota, mitä ne ovat).

Oikeastaan tästä päästäänkin probleemaan: Kielioppi sallii muodostaa vapaasti kaikenlaisia lauseita ”xxx (että) p”, monet niistä varsin kummallisia. Järki sanoo, etteivät ne kaikki ole modalisointeja. Jo Prior esitti puzzlen: mitkä lausekkeet itse asiassa edustavat modalisoivia operaattoreita? Jotkut pohtivat tätä, mutta eivät saaneet mitään tulosta. Hiljattain olen voinut kysyä asiaa eräältä johtavalta filos. loogikolta, mutta hän sanoi vain ei voivansa kertoa mitään.

Kaipa pitäisi tässä yhteydessä muistaa perinteinen ero lauseen sisällön ja moduksen välillä: samansisältöinen lause voi saada eri moduksia. Ja sisällöt eivät ole loogiselta kannalta mielenkiintoisia, vaan tuloksia ilmenee vain moduksista (ja muista loogisista muodoista). Klassikot ilmaisivat tämän usein niin, että *propositio* pysyy vakiona mutta ”*kopula*” voi vaihtua (Kant).

Voimme verrata jopa Fregen ”*Urteilsstreichiin*”, joka ei riipu itse lauseen sisällöstä.

Jos näin on, niin ne loogiset suhteet, joita modaalilogiikka käsittelee, eivät liity minkään lauseiden sisältöön, vaan niihin loogisiin operaatioihin, modaalisiin ja muihin, joita operaattorit merkitsevät. Tavallaan tämä tulos ei ole yllättävä: koska logiikka kerran koskee loogisia asioita, se ei milloinkaan kerro mitään kontingenttien tosiasioiden (tai ei-loogisten lauseiden) keskinäissuhteista (Hume).

Nyt pitäisi osoittaa, että asenneoperaattorit ovat loogisia elementtejä. Tätä ei kuitenkaan ole koskaan edes vakavasti yritetty. Konkreettinen seuraamus: ns. asennelogiikka oli alusta loppuun pelkkää väärinkäsitystä. Jos olisi aikaa, mutta tuskin on, väittäisin, että nämä sotkut johtuvat perimmältään piittaamattomuudesta käytön ja maininnan suhteen.

Johanna Ahola-Launonen

How to advance sustainable hope in sustainability transitions? Exploring the harmful and beneficial effects of techno-optimism

What role should technological solutions play in the climate crisis? This urgent question epitomizes a longstanding debate that spans a spectrum of perspectives from optimistic to pessimistic views regarding the possibilities of technology.

There is an expanding body of literature examining the dual nature of hope in general as both

a motivator and a potential source of misguidance in the context of climate action. Despite a long history of exploring hope's dual role as motivator and source of deception, systematic philosophical inquiries into its political relevance have only recently emerged [1]. These inquiries see hope as having both positive and negative potential. It can lead to naive optimism and an escape from social responsibility and reality. Yet, hope also empowers and motivates societal change and agency, enhances societal resilience and inclusivity, even as a civic virtue that constitutes sense of justice and democracy. [2-5]. These debates extend into evolving research on sustainability and social sciences, exploring how different types of hope influence pro-environmental behavior [6-8].

Hope towards technological solutions is, however, most often discussed in the narrower framework of techno-optimism: the belief that that technology makes the world a good, or better place [10-13]. Across various disciplines, hopes for technology are discussed with a polarized understanding of the possibilities of technology: Economic, industry, and policy perspectives favour techno-enthusiasm, while environmental, social, and philosophical studies of technology lean toward pessimism, and even dystopia [10-12].

The green transition is an example and object of study for understanding and defining the dual effects of technological optimism. The discourse on the green transition centres on 'green growth,' suggesting that innovations in renewable energy and material efficiency can support economic growth while addressing climate change by replacing unsustainable materials and energy [14]. Yet, current research suggests achieving climate targets requires a significant reduction in material flows [14-15]. Despite this, major political and societal trends remain focused on technology-driven green energy transitions that rely on the idea of substitution, not reduction. Such techno-fixing serves short-sighted political and economic goals, disproportionately benefiting the affluent, globally and locally [10]. As a problem-solving strategy, it reinforces a misguided perception of the abundance of available resources. This decreases the motivation to accept and advance policies, narratives, and visions that aim to fundamentally change the practices of exploitative consumption [16-17]. The expectation of a techno-fix that enables 'business as usual' creates a sense of unfairness concerning modifications and re-directions in one's life: why change my habits, if a technological answer is just around the corner?

Thus, techno-optimism in green transitions undoubtedly generates adverse effects. However, technological solutions are also necessary, and worthy of hope and optimism, to help society achieve a greener future: whichever desirable future is imagined, there will be a need for as-green-as-possible technologies to produce the radically reduced material and energy flows. Transitioning societies need "appropriate" technological optimism - or hope - that recognizes the important but limited problem-solving ability of technological answers. I argue that different types of techno-optimisms - or techno-hopes - can be differentiated: one that empowers, activates, and promotes systemic behavioral change from another that pacifies, generates misguiding optimism, and contributes to overconsumption.

In this presentation, I will discuss preliminary project results to make such a distinction. I examine techno-optimism as a thick concept that is, on one hand, loaded with a rich political context connected to late-stage capitalist and technocratic growth discourse, and on the other hand, as a concept analyzed in the philosophy of technology with notions such as moral and material ontologies, modal epistemic robustness, and the rational permissibility of hope. Yet, when reduced to its simplest form, techno-optimism amounts to nothing more than a certain way, even a very mild form, of optimism towards a specific category, even a very narrow one, of technology: for example, a moderate belief that meat-replacing food technology will have some positive effects in the quest to halt climate change.

My question, then, is: When criticizing or endorsing technological optimism, what exactly is being critiqued or supported? What attributes make techno-optimism harmful or beneficial, under what conditions are these stances justified, and what do harmful and beneficial hope mean in the context of technological optimism?

The thin consequentialist concepts of 'harm' and 'benefit' are used as productive functional tools to help to articulate embedded values and premises, as they are conceptually dependent on: pursued end-values; implied moral circles (those involved in weighing harms and benefits); the assumed probable, improbable, or impossible present and predicted future empirical facts (which are elemental to assessing optimistic stances and their relation to, e.g., the precautionary principle, and rational permissibility and justified conditions of optimism); and the sources of epistemic authority.

Words before bibliography: 790

1. Blöser, C. et al. 2020. Hope in political philosophy. *Philosophy Compass* 15:e12665.
2. Eagleton, Terry, 2015, *Hope Without Optimism*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
3. Snow, Nancy E. 2018. Hope as a Democratic Civic Virtue. *Metaphilosophy* 49(3): 407–427.
4. Stahl, T. 2020. Political Hope and Cooperative Community. In C. Blöser and T. Stahl (eds.), *The Moral Psychology of Hope*, London: Rowman & Littlefield International, pp. 265–284.
5. Moellendorf, D. 2022. *Mobilizing Hope: Climate Change and Global Poverty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Gili, G. et al. 2023. Is a Sociology of Hope Possible? An Attempt to Recompose a Theoretical Framework and a Research Programme. *Am Soc* 54, 7–35.
7. Lindroth, M. & Sinevaara-Niskanen, H. 2021. Politics of hope: Transformation or stagnation? In S.A.H. Hosseini et al. (eds): *Routledge Handbook of Transformative Global Studies*. London: Routledge, 230-242.
8. Hornsey, M. et al. 2016. A cautionary note about messages of hope. *Global Environmental Change*, 39, 26–34.
10. Johnston, S.F. 2020. *Techno-fixers: Origins and implications of technological faith*. McGill University Press.
11. Wilson, A. 2017. Techno-optimism and rational superstition. *Techné: Res. Philos. Technol* 21(2), 342–362.
12. Bassett, C. 2023. The Cruel Optimism of Technological Dreams. In J. Browne et al (eds): *Feminist AI: Critical Perspectives on Algorithms, Data, and Intelligent Machines* (Oxford, 2023: online edn, Oxford Academic)
13. Danaher, J. 2022. Techno-Optimism: An Analysis, an Evaluation and a Modest Defence. *Philos. Technol.* 35:54.
14. Giampietro, M. 2019. On the Circular Bioeconomy and Decoupling: Implications for Sustainable Growth. *Ecological Economics* 162:143–156.
15. Hickel, J, Kallis, G. 2020. Is Green Growth Possible? *New Political Economy* 25:469- 486.
16. Van Lente, H. 1993. *Promising Technology: Dynamics of Expectations in Technological Developments*. Proefschrift.
17. Heikkurinen, P et al. (eds). 2021. *Sustainability Beyond Technology: Philosophy, Critique, and Implications for Human Organization* (Oxford; online edn, Oxford Academic)

Valteri Arstila

Dainton and the continuity of consciousness

Barry Dainton's work on the continuity of consciousness introduces a critical distinction between two main theses: the moderate and the strong continuity theses. The moderate

continuity thesis posits that our stream of consciousness is continuous as long as there are no gaps in our experiences. In contrast, the strong continuity thesis (SCT) builds on this by suggesting that we also experience a sense of continuity within this stream, where each brief phase of experience flows seamlessly into the next. Dainton argues that only the SCT can account for the seamless flow of experience that characterizes our stream of consciousness. Moreover, he argues that his overlap model of time consciousness is uniquely equipped to support this thesis. In this talk, I contend that Dainton's theory fails to account for the SCT and that a closer inspection of his arguments shows that they fall short because there is a third form of continuity that Dainton has overlooked. Consequently, his overlap model of time-consciousness does not gain support from the SCT.

Expanding on these points, Dainton's work on time consciousness is situated within a broader philosophical inquiry into how temporal properties manifest in conscious experience. The central challenge here, as Dainton identifies, is to explain how we experience temporally extended events within a stream of consciousness that appears to be continuous. Dainton's overlap model of consciousness is a version of the specious present theories, in which our experiences are thought to embrace an interval (called specious present). Such specious presents account for the experience of temporally extended events, such as the experience of succession. The overlap model is intended to also address the SCT by suggesting that our stream of consciousness consists of overlapping specious presents, where the "succeeding" specious presents share numerically identical parts of the stream. This overlapping of specious presents is supposed to ensure that there are no missing phenomenal connections between phases of the stream, thus maintaining the continuity of experience. For instance, when hearing a continuous tone, Dainton posits that the latter part of the first specious present is numerically identical to the first part of the second specious present, thereby explaining the seamless flow from one moment to the next.

However, Dainton's explanation of how we experience temporally extended events in a stream of consciousness characterized by the SCT leads to a dilemma: Either he can explain our experiences of temporally extended events or the SCT, but not both. This is because he cannot provide a satisfactory account of our phenomenology after we have just experienced succession. This explanatory shortcoming is critical for his overlap model, because it is in general motivated by the former, and the latter provides the best argument for the theory.

Moreover, a closer examination of Dainton's arguments illustrates, that he associates experienced continuity with smoothness and seamlessness of the stream of consciousness, and that such association is unjustified. Accordingly, we need to separate a third form of continuity – the seamless continuity thesis, which maintains that our stream of consciousness flows seamlessly – from the moderate and strong continuity theses

Alex Carruth

Two Dimensions of the Hierarchy of Being

In a recent book, Jani Hakkarainen and Markku Keinänen (2023) outline their vision of a subdiscipline of metaphysics, primarily concerned with the nature of ontological categories and the relationships in which they stand to one another, which is often known as 'formal ontology'. One particularly intriguing potential consequence of the metatheory of formal ontology defended in the book – which proposes that ontological categories are to be analysed in terms of formal ontological relations – is that there is a distinction between what it means to be fundamental in a formal ontological sense, and what it means to be fundamental in an ontological sense. Where formal ontological fundamentality is a matter of whether the relevant formal ontological relations involved in the analysis of a category are derived or un-derived, ontological fundamentality is typically understood either in terms of what position an entity occupies in the 'great chain of being', or else in terms of some (perhaps vaguer) notion of ontological or metaphysical significance, autonomy and/or irreducibility. Although the authors

do not commit to any particular view concerning the relationship between formal ontological and ontological fundamentality, the foregoing characterisations raise the possibility that these come apart – an entity could be fundamental in one sense, and not in the other.

A further consequence of the metatheory is that one can distinguish between what this talk will call a 'pure' and 'impure' sense of formal ontological fundamentality – where purity is sensitive to which further formal ontological relations, beyond those involved in the analysis of the relevant category, members of that category may be related to. If we ask, then, about the status of a given ontological category vis-à-vis its formal ontological fundamentality, there are four potential answers: that it is purely formally ontologically fundamental; that it is impurely formally ontologically fundamental; that it is impurely formally ontologically non-fundamental and that it is purely formally ontologically non-fundamental.

Combining the distinction between the formal ontological and the ontological sense of fundamentality with the fine-grained taxonomy of pure/impure formal ontological (non)fundamentality generates a considerably richer conceptual space than has been previously recognised in metaphysical discussions which concern the hierarchy of being – that is, concerning where entities stand in the chain of being, what sorts of relationships might obtain between them, and what all this means for their overall metaphysical status. This talk aims (i) to briefly outline the character of the various options that make up this space; (ii) to examine whether each of them represents a consistent, coherent, intelligible etc. option and (iii) to indicate to what extent (if at all) adopting this enriched conception of the hierarchy of being might help us to make progress with various 'first order' debates in metaphysics.

References:

Hakkarainen, J. and Keinänen, M. (2003). *Formal Ontology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jan Forsman

Unnennäkö Margaret Cavendishin filosofiassa

Margaret Cavendishin (1623–1673) filosofia on viime aikoina saanut osakseen kasvavaa huomiota. Aikaansa nähden epätyypillisesti hän oli materialisti, joka kielsi aineettoman substanssin olemassaolon. Poiketen muiden aikakauden materialisteista, kuten Thomas Hobbesista (1588–1679), hän myös katsoi, ettei materia suinkaan ole vain 'kuollutta' ainetta, jota ulkoinen liike liikuttaa, vaan elävää, aistivaa ja ajattelevaa. Tästä syystä monet pitävät Cavendishia vitalistina ja panpsykistinä (esim. Cunning 2016; 2022; Lascano & Schliesser 2022; Lascano 2023), joka katsoi kaiken olemassa olevan elävän ja kykenevän jonkinlaiseen rationaalisuuteen (ks. kuitenkin Georgescu 2023; Peterman forthcoming). Ihmisten, kuten kaiken muunkin olemassa olevan, kohdalla Cavendish katsoo näiden muodostuvan kolmesta eri aineen tyypistä: ei-liikkuvasta, aistivasta, ja rationaalisesta materiasta. Tätä ei pidä kuitenkaan ymmärtää niin, että tietty osa ihmisestä (esim. aivot) koostuisi pelkästään rationaalisesta materiasta, kun taas jokin toinen osa (esim. silmä) koostuisi pelkästään aistivasta materiasta. Kaikki materia on Cavendishin mukaan näistä kolmesta sekoitettua, pienintä aineen osaa myöten, jolloin jokainen ihmisen osa (kuten myös niiden osien osat) muodostuu näistä kolmesta. Ihmisten kohdalla Cavendish katsoo, että kaikki (todenmukainen) havaitseminen on aina niin kutsuttua kaksoishavaitsemista (eng. double perception), jossa sekä sensitiivinen että rationaalinen materia toimivat yhdessä synkronisesti. Cavendishin näkemykset mielikuvituksesta ja fantasiasta ovat viime aikoina olleet laajasti keskusteltuja (esim. Hock 2018; Gilman-Sherman 2021, chapter 4), mutta hänen näkemyksensä unista ja unennäöstä ovat jääneet vähemmälle huomiolle. Tähän mennessä

David Cunning (2016, 36–37) ja Marcy Lascano (2023, 112–116) ovat tehneet johdonmukaisimmat analyysit Cavendishin unennäköä koskevista kirjoituksista, Cunningin keskittyessä kysymykseen unen ja valvetilan erottamisesta ja Lascanon käsitellessä todenmukaisen havainnon luonnetta Cavendishilla. Kumpikaan ei kuitenkaan käsittele sitä, mikä tekee Cavendishin mukaan unennäöstä erilaista muista "voluntaarisista sisäisistä toiminnoista (eng. voluntary interior actions)" (ks. *Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy [OEP]*, 1666, s. 171), kuten mielikuvituksesta ja muistista.

Esitelmässäni käsittelen Cavendishin näkemyksiä unennäöstä, keskittyen kysymykseen, mikä tekee uneksimisesta erillisen inhimillisen kognition ominaisuuden verrattuna ajatteluun, muistamiseen, ja mielikuvitukseen. Esitän että toisin kuin muisti ja kuvittelukyky, joiden Cavendish katsoo olevan rationaalisen materian liikettä erillään sensitiivisestä materiasta, unennäkö on rationaalisen ja sensitiivisen materian synkronista voluntaarista liikettä (jota Cavendish kutsuu termillä "kuviointi (eng. figuring)"), ilman ulkoisten kohteiden kopiointia kehon ulkopuolelta (jota Cavendish kutsuu termillä "mallintaminen (eng. patterning)"). (Ks. esim. *Philosophical Letters [PL]*, 1664.) Kiinnostavasti, Cavendish myös esittää, että sensitiivinen ja rationaalinen materia voisivat mahdollisesti tehdä tämän tyyppistä kuviointia ilman ulkoa mallinnettuja kopioita (PL osa II, kirje 14). Tällöin olisi mahdollista nähdä unta ilman että olisi koskaan nähnyt ulkoisia kohteita valvetilassa. Esitelmän loppuksi vertaan Cavendishin unennäköä koskevia näkemyksiä siihen miten hän tekee erotteluun valveillaolon ja unen välillä ja käsittelen kysymystä siitä, onko Cavendishillä välineitä vastata unennäköön perustuviin skeptisiin skenaarioihin.

Shad Gilbert

A Buddhist Unrocking of the Young Quine's Chair.

While still a graduate student employing the pragmatist epistemology of his professor C. I. Lewis (1883-1964), philosopher Willard V. O. Quine (1908-2000) composed an insightful essay touching upon our knowledge of chairs. Entitled "Concepts and Working Hypotheses," this unpublished work considers our potential cognition of this common piece of furniture in order to illustrate the systematic accommodation of bare data in fields ranging from the sciences to artistic criticism and interpretive history. We are presented with a chair, a highly conceptualized entity from the moment of perception, then go on to further analyze it according to our needs: Victorian, oak, rocking style, a swarm of electric charges, and so on. Even its epistemological division into the conceptual and nonconceptual amounts to an addition, and veridical chair pronouncements from one field of analysis are simply irrelevant in others. Still championing the distinction between analytic and synthetic relationships, this young Quine further presents his well-known case for consistency across all disciplines. Perhaps unsurprisingly, sixth-century Buddhist Chinese Prince Zhaoming 昭明太子 (501-531) tells a different story. In the court discussions recorded in the *Guang Hong Ming Ji* 廣弘明集 document *On the Meaning of the Two Truths* 令旨解二諦義, Prince Zhaoming elaborates on a discussion begun a century earlier by Chinese Buddhist forebear Sengzhao 僧肇 (384-414) regarding objects and their motion; the reader may consider rocking chairs and their rocking. Arguably, Sengzhao had affirmed the existence of objects like rocking chairs while denying the action of their rocking (e.g. "the Yangtzu and the Yellow River while surging down do not flow... the sun and moon while transiting the heavens do not circle," trans. Robinson), yet Prince Zhaoming goes one step further, asserting that the enlightened sage who correctly perceives reality as empty cannot even see such objects. "Existence and non-existence are... of one essence" (正以有不異無無不異有, trans. Swanson), so chairs, rivers, the sun, and the moon are simply imperceptible. The young Quine and Prince Zhaoming may unite in endorsing the relativity of truth since "for the sage to perceive non-existence means that that is truth for him or her" while "the common person decides that one perceives existence; thus for him or her, this is the truth," (聖人見無在聖為諦。凡夫審謂為有。故於凡為諦), yet the prince's answer to the

question “Does the sage perceive the worldly truth, or not perceive the worldly truth?” (聖人為見世諦為不見世諦) differs remarkably from any that Quine would offer: “Sages know that common men perceive the existence of the worldly truth, but the sage does not perceive [the worldly truth].... He does not perceive the worldly truth, but the unhindered sage knows what is perceived by the common person” (聖人知凡人見有世諦。若論聖人不復見此……自不見世諦。無妨聖人知凡夫所見)。

That an able-bodied human could be wholly blind to the initial presentation of a chair and merely aware of others’ chair perceptions not only stretches credulity but also short-circuits a Quinean-Lewisian epistemology beginning with the experience of an object. How is this to be understood? Can a pragmatist theory of knowledge accommodate such a view? This invites further consideration. Furthermore, with modern society’s increasing calls for nondiscriminatory “blindness” toward such attributes as age, class, and race, thoughtful treatment of the prospects for such practices seems in order. Are these even possible? Prince Zhao would seem to say “yes,” while the young Quine and his pragmatist forebears would ostensibly dissent. This paper’s assessment of “chair blindness” serves as a springboard for future consideration of one particular blindness, that directed at gender.

Jani Hakkarainen

Holistic Understanding as the Primary Epistemic Aim of Metaphysics

As far as I can tell, metametaphysics has only very recently been at least a bit informed by the recent growing literature on the epistemic aim and progress of philosophy, and especially the epistemology of understanding (e.g., Beebe 2018, Rosen 2020, McSweeney 2023, Sjölin Wirling forthcoming). In the talk, I will discuss the epistemic aim of metaphysics. Epistemic aim of a discipline is the epistemic achievement that is the collective goal of the inquirers of the discipline. Individual inquirers, and perhaps the entire field, too, may have other aims as well, such as more practical goals. The primary or principal epistemic aim of metaphysics (i.e., the epistemic aim of the highest epistemic importance) is what the epistemic point of metaphysical study, so to speak, is.

I argue that holistic understanding about metaphysical matters construed from a formal ontological point of view is the primary epistemic aim of metaphysics as a field of inquiry. The formal ontological approach emphasises the structured nature of ontological categories, comprising formal ontological relations, as central to the subject matter of metaphysics. Holistic understanding is an epistemic achievement precisely about a system, structure, subject matter, or body of information whose constituent parts or elements are appropriately related to one another. Most likely, it involves grasping these relations and their system, rather than being an isolated or episodic individual proposition as it can be in the case of propositional knowledge. Holistic understanding is a distinct epistemic achievement from propositional knowledge since holistic understanding allows for falsehoods unlike propositional knowledge the object proposition has to be true. However, I set aside the factivity/non-factivity of metaphysical understanding in this talk (whether it is necessary or not that metaphysical holistic understanding consists centrally of truths).

The view that the primary epistemic aim of metaphysics is holistic understanding makes better sense of the actual nature and practices of metaphysical study, when considered collectively, compared to the notion that metaphysics primarily seeks to provide true answers to metaphysical questions or even collective convergence on such answers or knowledge of them (held or assumed by many regarding philosophy (e.g., Brennan 2010, Dietrich 2011, Chalmers 2015)) (cf. Hannon & Nguyen 2022 and Dellsen et al. forthcoming). First, in metaphysics,

systematic understanding is preferred over unconnected episodic or isolated knowledge. It is not enough that I know some minor detail about what substances are; I need to grasp how they are supposed to be related to other categories (e.g., attributes). Second, the demonstration of specific cognitive skills, such as proficient argumentation, is prioritized over mere beliefs or knowledge of the true answers to metaphysical questions in contexts of expertise, recruitment, and student evaluation practices. Epistemologists widely agree that demonstrating such skills is indicative of the possession of understanding. Therefore, one cannot do good metaphysics by testimony or deference alone; one needs to demonstrate one's own capabilities and skills. Third, the field of metaphysics is characterized by enduring, even perennial problems and debates, such as those concerning ontological categories (for instance, substance theories versus bundle theories), rather than a convergence on a singularly true view. Consequently, a diverse range of metaphysical theories are expected to be taught and critically surveyed in the literature. Various perspectives on a metaphysical subject matter contribute to our understanding of it, which is in line with the general nature of understanding. Therefore, even perennial disagreements in metaphysics are not necessarily indicative of a weak epistemic status of the field. We can learn even from false historical views, such as Descartes' dualist substance-mode metaphysics. It can shed light on the possible category of modes even though it involves a false account of matter. Finally, the bottoming-out of disagreements between competing metaphysical theories, such as the disagreement between substance and process metaphysics, is widely considered epistemically valuable since in this kind of situations we understand where the disagreement lies exactly. My proposal opens the avenue for progress in metaphysics through the acquisition of holistic understanding even though it may not offer a definitive true theory or achieve collective convergence on such a theory. I propose that if progress can be achieved in acquiring holistic understanding within the domain of metaphysics, then metaphysics can rightfully be classified as a science in the broadest sense.

Mirja Hartimo

*Logical Analysis *3*

This talk will identify and discuss three different approaches to logic and respectively three ways of using logic in philosophy. The views on logic are 1) the view of logic as "obvious" or without a need for justification germane to the "logico-centric predicament" of early analytic philosophy, 2) the critical view of logic (Charles Parsons, 2015) that emphasizes an entanglement of logic with some other branch of science, such as mathematics, and 3) anti-exceptionalist views, according to which logic is continuous with science, as advanced by e.g. Timothy Williamson and Ole Hjortland. These different views are connected to three kinds of logical analysis 1) Quinean regimentation, 2) explication, and 3) modelling empirical data. The talk ends with a brief evaluation of the philosophical merits of each of these approaches.

Karri Heikkinen

Contractualist Population Ethics

In this paper, I propose a new contractualist theory of population ethics. My view stems from a very simple and powerful idea, which is nevertheless almost universally rejected among contemporary writers in both Rawlsian and Scanlonian traditions. I suggest that when trying to decide which future population we should bring into existence, we should ask: if the different possible people that could come to exist depending on what we choose had to settle the issue among themselves, which option would they agree on?

I argue that we can approach this question in terms of what I call existential claims. These are moral claims that a possible person has for or against being brought into existence, the strength of which depends on how good or bad the life of that person would be. This framing is useful because the question of which existential claims should be satisfied is analogous to another question that contractualists are very familiar with, namely the question of which competing moral claims should be satisfied in ordinary cases of interpersonal aggregation—such as Scanlon’s (1998) famous Transmitter Room example.

I argue that we can combine this framing with the most popular view in the interpersonal aggregation literature, known as partial aggregation (e.g. Kamm 1993, Voorhoeve 2014, Tadros 2019, Mann 2021). I propose the following.

Aggregate Relevant Existential Claims (AREC): In a choice of population, we ought to choose the alternative that satisfies the greatest sum of strength-weighted, relevant existential claims, where an existential claim is relevant if and only if it is sufficiently strong relative to the strongest existential claim that it competes with.

Having outlined the view, I demonstrate that AREC can deal with three persistent issues in population ethics, namely the non-identity problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Sadistic Conclusion (Parfit 1984, Arrhenius 2003).

There are many potential objections to AREC. For the purposes of this paper, I limit my discussion to what I take to be the most influential objection to views like AREC in the existing literature on contractualism and future people. In doing so, I address a natural question: if AREC achieves such appealing results, why have scholars in this tradition not adopted the view already?

The answer to this question, I believe, can be traced back to a line of thought found in Finneron-Burns (2016, 2024), Mulgan (2006) and Barry (1989). The objection is that we cannot include possible people in contractualist moral deliberation, for if we did, then almost any ordinary act could be reasonably rejected (or disputed behind a veil of ignorance) by those possible people who never get to exist due to that act. The only general principle that could perhaps not be rejected would be the one of maximising population size at the cost of everything else, to allow as many people as possible to exist—but this would effectively lead us back to the Repugnant Conclusion.

In response, I point out that AREC gives us a way to think about justification to possible people, without leading us to the Repugnant Conclusion. One way to understand what is going on here is to note that the objection assumes a very Rawlsian (1971) picture of possible people as self-interested maximisers. But we need not accept that: we can adopt a more Scanlonian view instead.

In sum then, AREC has the resources to respond to objections stemming from the existing contractualist literature, in addition to securing intuitively attractive results. This, I believe, shows that the previously unpopular idea of justifying our choices to possible people is worth further development.

Bibliography

- Arrhenius, Gustaf. An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies. *Economics & Philosophy*, 16(2), pp. 247–266.
- Barry, Brian, 1989. *Theories of Justice*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Finneron-Burns, Elizabeth, 2024. *What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of*

Intergenerational Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Finneron-Burns, Elizabeth, 2016. Contractualism and the Non-Identity Problem. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 19, pp. 1151–1163.

Kamm, Frances Myrna, 1993. *Morality, Mortality: Death and Whom to Save From It*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mann, Kirsten, 2021. The Relevance View: Defended and Extended. *Utilitas*, 33(1), pp. 101–110.

Mulgan, Tim, 2006. *Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist Account of our Obligations to Future Generations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parfit, Derek, 1984. *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, John, 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Scanlon, Thomas Michael, 1998. *What we owe to each other*. London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Tadros, Victor, 2019. Localized Restricted Aggregation. In *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 5*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Voorhoeve, Alex, 2014. How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? *Ethics*, 125(1), pp. 64–87.

Ilmari Hirvonen

Hansson's Definition of Pseudoscience: Praise and Improvement

In a series of articles, Sven Ove Hansson (1996; 2009; 2013; 2020) has presented several definitions of pseudoscience, each attempting to improve on the previous one. This paper examines the development of Hansson's definitions. It will also demonstrate some of their strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, it will try to amend Hansson's shortcomings and offer an improved definition of pseudoscience.

Despite its evolution, Hansson's thinking has several recurring themes. One is the insistence that pseudoscience involves a deviant doctrine or "sustained promotion of teachings that lack scientific legitimacy" (Hansson 2020, 50; see also 1996, 173; 2009, 240; 2013, 69). Following the Oxford English Dictionary, Hansson defines a doctrine as "a set of interconnected statements that is 'taught or laid down as true concerning a particular subject or department of knowledge'" (Hansson 2020, 49). Another recurring theme in Hansson's philosophy is his scientism (although Hansson does not use this term himself). According to Hansson, "science represents the most epistemically warranted statements", and its task is "to provide the most reliable information" (Hansson 2009, 237, 239; see also 2013, 63, 70). This scientific view has also influenced his definition of pseudoscience.

Initially, Hansson defended the rather traditional view that pseudoscientific doctrines are not scientific, but their proponents try to create the impression that they are (Hansson 1996, 174). Later, he stated that pseudoscientists do not have to claim that their doctrines are scientific but that they count as reliable knowledge (Hansson 2009, 240). Even later, he maintained that pseudoscience is claimed to be "the most reliable knowledge on its subject matter", although it is so unreliable that it cannot be trusted at all (Hansson 2013, 70; 2020, 49). One problem with these later definitions is that some proponents of pseudoscience do not claim that their doctrines are the most reliable ones available. Instead, some merely assert that they work in practice (e.g., Erikson 2024).

Another problem with these later definitions is that some claims of most reliable knowledge without justification do not seem to be pseudoscientific. A case in point is religious fundamentalism. However, Hansson is aware of this and requires that pseudoscience "pertains to an issue within the domain of science" and "religious and spiritual statements" do not fall within this domain (Hansson 2009, 237, 240; 2013, 70; 2020, 49, 50). This solution, in turn, is problematic because some religious claims seem to fall within the domain of science. For

instance, some theological interpretations of creation or Earth's location in the solar system have contradicted scientific theories. Moreover, if some statement does not belong to the domain of science but is claimed to be scientific, then this seems to be a clear example of pseudoscience.

To answer these issues, it is suggested that pseudoscience must still have some association or connotation with science—often done to benefit from the prestige and authority of science—even if its promoters explicitly deny that it is science. In addition, it is argued that intersubjective evaluability is necessary for science. Hence, pseudoscience can fail epistemically in three ways. Pseudoscientific doctrines are unjustified or unwarranted because either:

1. It is not possible to evaluate them epistemically.
2. They are epistemically evaluable but insufficiently justified.
3. They are epistemically evaluable, but their falsity is justified.

Such epistemic failures are somewhat in line with Hansson's 2009 definition of pseudoscience, which states that pseudoscientific statements are not epistemically warranted, and they belong to a doctrine whose proponents "try to create the impression that it is epistemically warranted" (Hansson 2009, 237, 240).

However, epistemic failures alone do not turn something into pseudoscience. Pseudoscientists must also sustainedly claim that their doctrine is considerably more justified than it is, and this must be done in a manner that clearly deviates from subtle exaggeration typical in science. Further, the doctrine must have some association or connotation with science.

Säde Hormio

Droplets of Detriment and Pint-sized Profits

Individual contributions to collectively caused outcomes can sometimes be very small, even so tiny as to make no relevant difference. Yet, in aggregate, these small contributions can result in a morally significant outcome, whether good or bad. Moral theories struggle to explain why individuals should make or withhold such contributions, which is problematic, as many global ills today are best described as small contributions to a great harm (Kutz 2000; Lichtenberg 2014; Nefsky 2019). Some prominent examples discussed in the literature include microplastics found in the oceans, greenhouse gases emitted around the world accumulating in the atmosphere to cause climate change, or customers buying products made with sweatshop labour. It seems that we want to give individuals a reason not to make these contributions, because if no contributor feels that they should act differently, there is a danger that tackling many modern harms will appear to be the responsibility of no one.

When a collectively caused outcome is morally significant, it should give individuals a reason to contribute to it, or to refrain from doing so, but if the contributions make no difference, it seems hard to pinpoint what that normative reason is. I will call this the Problem of Small Contributions. The problem can be discussed in terms of what moral reasons are there for (not) performing acts of a certain type, or what moral reasons are there for (not) performing some particular token act. While there might not always be a reason for (not) performing a particular act on a given occasion (i.e. the Token Problem persists), we can have a moral pro tanto reason for why we should or should not perform certain types of acts (offering a solution to the Type Problem).

Although the literature so far has focused on the Token Problem of Small Contributions, that is, on momentary choice situations, I will argue that more attention should be paid to the Type Problem of Small Contributions. The emphasis thus should be on individual behaviour over time. I suggest that we should care about our marginal contributions as tokens of harmful or beneficial patterns, even when not every instance counts.

Matti Häyry

Flirtations With Human Extinction in Twentieth-Century Utilitarianism

Human extinction is, for most, an unthinkable idea, its eventual inevitability notwithstanding. Philosophers have not, however, been strangers to the idea. Especially Arthur Schopenhauer's (1851) pessimism has inspired other thinkers – Kurnig (1901), Peter Wessel Zapffe (1933), and Julio Cabrera (1989) are paragon examples – to produce versions of nihilist or negative ethics. Analytic philosophers, it has been thought, joined this continental-philosophy party only more recently with David Benatar's (1997) work. There is, however, an earlier occurrence, in G. E. Moore's (1903) *Principia Ethica*. Its nature is best explained against the background of a later debate on utilitarianism.

In *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Karl Popper (1945) suggested that one of the main "principles of humanitarian and equalitarian ethics" is "[t]he recognition that all moral urgency has its basis in the urgency of suffering or pain." For him, "the greatest mistake of [classical] utilitarianism" was not recognizing "that from the moral point of view suffering and happiness must not be treated as symmetrical", hence not seeing that "the promotion of happiness is ... less urgent than the rendering of help to those who suffer, and the attempt to prevent suffering." The reduction and minimization of suffering rather than the promotion and maximization of happiness should be our aim.

R. N. Smart (1958) named Popper's view negative utilitarianism (NU) and argued that while it has some advantages in making things clearer, "any [such] clarity ... is bought at the expense of allowing certain absurd and even wicked moral judgments." Smart's main example was the benevolent world exploder. In his imaginary example, "a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race." Knowing that "there would be some suffering" in the lives of "all those alive" were they "to die in the natural course of events", "the use of the weapon is bound to diminish suffering, and would be the ruler's duty on NU grounds."

That this judgment would be "absurd and even wicked" has been taken more or less for granted in moral philosophy ever since. H. B. Acton (1963) and J. W. N. Watkins (1963) criticized Smart for failing to recognize the distinction between reduction of suffering and elimination of suffering and argued that Popper's reductionist view would not assign the ruler the duty Smart envisaged. That may or may not exonerate Popper (the ideal end result of reduction is still elimination) but it does not remove the question. If the benevolent world exploder could eliminate all suffering, should it be done? The consensus has been that since this would spell the end of humankind, it should not.

The anti-extinctionist consensus has been sporadically challenged since the 1990s by activists and philosophers, notably Les Knight (1991), David Benatar (1997; 2006), and Patricia MacCormack (2020). Their proposals are, however, mainly based on voluntary choices and consent, not dictatorial decisions to end people's lives against their will. The association with murder seems to be the deterrent against the latter in consequentialist, deontological, and teleological theories alike. This is why it is so fascinating that G. E. Moore in 1903 addressed exactly that question, the question of murder, without prejudice and with interesting corollaries concerning the acceptability of voluntary human extinction.

Moore conceded that murder can be proven to be wrong in individual cases, because people

want to live and killing them against their will would not only end their lives but also cause general insecurity among others. If everybody's death would produce the greatest net good, however, the situation would be different. Moore (1903, 156) wrote:

"[The] general disutility of murder can only be proved, provided the majority of the human race will certainly persist in existing. In order to prove that murder, if it were so universally adopted as to cause the speedy extermination of the race, would not be good as a means, we should have to disprove the main contention of pessimism – namely that the existence of human life is on the whole an evil. And the view of pessimism, however strongly we may be convinced of its truth or falsehood, is one which never has been either proved or refuted conclusively. That universal murder would not be a good thing at this moment can therefore not be proved."

I will dissect this passage and present comparative and complementary views on the possibility that "human life is on the whole an evil." Extinctionist protestations aside, Moore was probably right in saying that the matter cannot be proven one way or the other. Even this conclusion, however, shows that what has been seen as an indisputable argument against negative utilitarianism may not have the strength assigned to it.

Tero Ijäs

Are Proper Functions Obsolete?

Purposefulness has been described as a distinguishing characteristic that sets the biological world apart from nonliving nature. Different fields of biology are rife with statements about the functions of this-or-that trait or structure. Functional statements are viewed as explanatory. They address the questions "How does X work?" and more fundamentally, "What is X for?" (see Mayr 1961). Although there are several ways how biological function can be understood, special focus has been given to so-called proper functions (Griffiths 1993). The notion of proper function aims to capture the intuition that not all functionalities of a biological trait are equal. Standing on two feet allows a football goalkeeper a better reach on the top corners of the goal. However, better goalkeeping does not explain the presence of bipedalism in humans. According to the predominant theory, the proper functions of biological organisms and traits are determined by their evolutionary history. In this selected effects account (SE), proper function of a trait is defined by what it was selected for by natural selection (Neander 1991). Recently, however, several philosophers have questioned different aspects of SE theory. This paper analyzes some of these recent challenges and their implications for the applicability of SE. While agreeing with some criticisms, I defend the use of proper functions and argue that the concept should be retained.

SE account of proper functions is seen to have several benefits. First, it is objective: proper functions are not defined by the desiderata of the research, but by the evolutionary history of the organism. Second, they are seen as explanatory: citing a proper function is seen to explain the presence of a trait. For example, why are peppered moths colored in a certain way? To avoid detection by predators by camouflaging them to a tree bark and lichen. Third, it provides an intuitive way to make a distinction between the proper function and a mere side effect. Thus, better goalkeeping is just an incidental function of bipedalism, whereas its proper function might be thermoregulation or freeing the hands for the use of tools. Finally, proper function allows us to assess the normal functionality of traits and to make normative claims about dysfunction.

Selected effects theory has emerged as the most prevalent way of defining the proper functions of traits. However, lately significant challenges have been presented towards SE

account. Critics have argued that SE does not match well with the complex reality of evolutionary dynamics. In order to work, SE has to make several simplifying assumptions on natural selection and selective environments, and thus seems to work only in a limited number of basic cases (Christie et al. 2021). Matthewson (2020), in turn, contends that the effects of natural selection to traits are a matter of degree whereas SE theory treats proper functions as discreet and has no adequate account of what constitutes a partial proper function. Most strongly, Ratti and Germain (2022) argue that the whole notion of proper functions is a relic of a view where organisms are seen as similar to machines and described through language of design and engineering. They claim that proper functions have only heuristic value and are irrelevant to current biological research. Therefore, the talk of proper functions should be abandoned.

This paper discusses these criticisms and acknowledges the significant challenges they pose to the SE account of proper functions. However, I argue that these challenges do not justify discarding the notion of proper functions entirely. I defend the relevance of the SE account for biology and distinguish between the heuristic and methodological uses of the concept. Finally, drawing on recent work on biological agency by Samir Okasha (2018), I propose that aspects of proper functions could be reinterpreted through the lens of minimal biological agency.

References

- Christie, J. R., Brusse, C., Bourrat, P., Takacs, P., & Griffiths, P. E. (2021). Are biological traits explained by their "selected effect" functions? *Australasian Philosophical Review*, (Preprint). <https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19832/>.
- Griffiths, P. E. (1993). Functional Analysis and Proper Functions. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 44(3), 409–422.
- Matthewson, J. (2020). Does proper function come in degrees? *Biology & Philosophy*, 35(4), 39.
- Mayr, E. (1961). Cause and Effect in Biology: Kinds of causes, predictability, and teleology are viewed by a practicing biologist. *Science*, 134(3489), 1501–1506.
- Neander, K. (1991). Functions as selected effects: The conceptual analyst's defense. *Philosophy of science*, 58(2), 168–184.
- Okasha, S. (2018). *Agents and Goals in Evolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ratti, E., & Germain, P.-L. (2022). A relic of design: against proper functions in biology. *Biology & Philosophy*, 37(4), 27.

Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson

The Story of a Strawman Argument: Russell's 'On the Notion of Cause'

Causal realism in the 20th century has been marred by a strange confusion about causal efficacy, one that the revival of powers-based accounts of causation are only now slowly sorting out. The confusion is to treat events or states as the relata of causal efficacy, and thus to think that causes exert influence on their effects. In the words of Ned Hall (2004), the idea here is that there is a "Link, biff, oomph" between cause and effect. I have come to think that Russell's famous paper 'On the Notion of Cause' is the main culprit responsible for this development. In this talk I will explain what Russell did, illustrate the catastrophic consequences for causal realism in the 20th century, and explain how recent powers-based accounts are trying to sort the problem. Roughly, Russell claimed that the notion of cause is an outmoded relic of a 'bygone age'. To support his claim, he first characterises causation as a necessary connection between two temporally successive, non-overlapping, and yet contiguous events, of which the former exerts an influence on the latter. Second, that if time has the structure of the continuum, then two successive non-overlapping events cannot be contiguous; between any end of a cause and beginning of an event, no matter how close they are, there

will always be an infinity of time-points in between where—in principle—something could intervene to change or stop the influence of the cause from being passed on to the effect. Ergo, there can be no necessary connection between them. This is now known as the problem of action at a temporal distance. It is clear that Russell takes causal realism to be his target, i.e. the idea that changes are produced by the exertion of influence of something on something else. However, his characterisation of causation has nothing at all to do with any view that any causal realist has ever defended, nor has anyone before Russell appealed to it in defence of causal necessity. The argument is thus a straw man argument. Unfortunately, the event-causal model of causal efficacy that Russell presented came to be adopted as a standard formulation of causal realism (i.e. as a 'link, biff, oomph' between cause and effect) to the detriment of those views. What philosophers of the bygone age said about causal efficacy—Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Atomists, the Scholastics, the Early modern philosophers (empiricist and rational realist alike), as well as Reid and Kant in the eighteenth century—is that it is exerted between continuant objects, which produces a change in those continuants and thus gives rise to the effect. If causation involves production, it is impossible for a cause to exert an influence on something that does not exist, and by doing the impossible bring the effect into existence. I will argue that not only is this the historically correct view that Russell should have addressed, but also that it is the one that makes most sense, not the least in light of established scientific understanding of physical interactions and chemical reactions.

Haran Jeong

Representing time with or without memory

Philosophers often content that perceptually representing temporal relation as of A followed by B requires memory of the previous state A when B is present. A classical advocate of this view is Thomas Reid, who posits that visual motion perception is possible "by the aid of memory" of the preceding motion sequence (1850, p. 237). Similarly, Bertrand Russell suggests that a series of sounds is represented in virtue of remembering the preceding sound, while carefully distinguishing "immediate memory", which is directly connected to perceptual process, from the explicit act of recalling past content as such (1915). Likewise, Edmund Husserl proposes that the previous impression, termed "retention", influences the interpretation of the present sensation (2014).

However, remembering A is distinct from the act of successively connecting it to B. Contemporary philosophers rather consider the form of succession, i.e., "followed by" as an additional component separate from the previous impression of A and the current one of B, which together compose the representation of A followed by B. They often refer to William James who maintains that the feeling of succession is not as identical to the succession of feelings (1890, pp. 628–629).

Some of them even reject the involvement of memory in constituting the temporal representation, arguing that the continuous stream of consciousness or the objective succession of worldly states is sufficient to establish the temporal representation in question (e.g., Arstila, 2018; Dainton, 2008; Lee, 2014; Tye, 2003, pp. 87–88). Others still maintain that at least an implicit form of memory is necessary to hold the previous impression A as an integral component of the representation of A followed by B (e.g., Le Poidevin, 2007, p. 91; Pelczar, 2010; Phillips, 2018; Prosser, 2016, pp. 130–133).

The problem lies in the ontologically ambiguous status of the recent past sub-content A, which is neither fully present nor entirely past within the representational state of A followed by B. If A is co-present with B not in virtue of memory, no matter what grounds the structure of "followed by", another story should be told to preserve A for temporal representation. But what if we usually represent time as "followed by B" without explicit reference to the previous content, more precisely, as "intended at B" or "yielding B"? What if the full-blown representation of A followed by B is more sophisticated form of temporal representation than that without A?

A classical example, drawn from David Hume, involves the scenario where the event A, namely my act of eating bread, is followed by the event B, feeling satiety. We typically take the interoceptive state of satiety as causally related to the preceding act. Nevertheless, explicitly referring to this act as the cause of satiety emphasises something unusual about this act, such as having eaten too much. The more usual representation is “followed by the interoceptive state of satiety” without reference to the preceding act. One might say that the later state implicates the earlier state due to our habituation to the biological regularity whereby eating bread leads to satiety.

However, proponents of the memory theory typically cite the auditory succession of musical notes or the sound of knocking as paradigmatic examples of temporal representation. They may refine their theory by restrict their explananda to temporal representation of external, worldly states. This representation takes a form of A followed by B, so they would argue, necessitating the involvement of memory to retain A. Yet, by shifting the focus to changes in our bodily state and spontaneous action in response to the environmental changes, there is still room for a more primitive representation of time.

The aim of my talk is therefore to explore whether and how auditory succession can take the form of “followed by B” without an explicit reference of A, drawing on phenomenological analysis and a review of behavioural studies. Furthermore, I will delineate this primitive representation from the more delicate form of “A followed by B”, which is implicitly or explicitly supported by memory

Polaris Koi

Options as Mentalia

When I make a choice, I am faced with a set of options. But how come my options are the ones they are? And what does it take for something to be an option? In theorising about intending, choosing, and acting, the presence of a salient, well-defined decision set is a starting point rather than the topic of inquiry. Despite being often overlooked, the generation of a decision set is a necessary feature of intentional action. The nature of decision sets is of relevance across diverse areas including but not limited to philosophy of action, work on moral responsibility, and philosophy of economics.

In this paper, I examine this issue by asking two interconnected questions:

1. What are options? There are constraints to what can be an option (i.e., a decision set constituent). For example, the number 6 can be a constituent in a set of numbers, but not in a decision set – I cannot decide to 6. What sorts of constraints explain this?
2. How do agents arrive at decision sets? There are both commonalities and idiosyncrasies in the decision sets from which we select. To explain these, we need to understand the processes by which decision sets are generated.

The first question is conceptual, while the second is empirical. My focus is on the first, but exploring it requires some remarks about the second.

I take an agent to be an entity with the capacity for intentional action or, at minimum, for endogenous selection among competing courses of behaviour. I take a decision set to be a set of items that an agent chooses from. Rather than clumsily speak of decision set constituents (DSCs), I will refer to DSCs as options.

On a widespread view, options are simply any available alternatives or behavioural trajectories an agent has in the world. This is an influential approach taken as a premise across multiple literatures: for example, the notion of overall freedom (Pattanaik & Xu 1990) is frequently associated with the number of alternatives available for the agent in the world. In behavioural

economics (Glimcher 2011), with its popular notion of 'nudging', alternatives are thought of as being 'out there' in the world (Thaler & Sunstein 2008).

Conceiving of options as agent-external makes for very large sets of options. For example, someone choosing where to take their partner for dinner has all the restaurants in town in their decision set. There are, however, several reasons to believe that decision sets are smaller than the range objective alternatives, unless the set of such alternatives is very small to begin with. The most obvious of these is epistemic. The person choosing the restaurant might not know all the restaurants in town. As such, the sets of items that agents, in fact, decide among must be subjective.

There are two ways that that we might construe of subjective decision sets.

- a. Subjective decision sets are made up of 'external options'. The set of external options is winnowed down by some mechanism(s), such as epistemic constraints (Caplin & Dean 2015; Smith 2010) or 'sensitivity mechanisms' (McClelland 2020).
- b. Embrace mentalism about options. Subjective decision sets are made up of options as mental content, specifically, as mental representations of courses of behaviour.

Option A, however, does not fully capture the scope of options agents decide among. Options are sometimes products of our imagination, misapprehension, recollection, or creative synthesis. A painter deliberating on what to create is not selecting from things that are found in the world as such. Rather, she is envisioning something new. Such options are best understood as mental representations, rather than as something discovered in the world. Rather than taking some options to be mind-independent possibilities and others to be mental representations, I will offer a unified account in which all options are mentalia. This allows us to consider options as mental states and to apply what we know about the cognitive processes associated with mental representations (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird 1983; Smortchkova, Schlicht, & Dolega 2020) to understanding decision sets and their constituents.

I develop option internalism as a descriptive, rather than normative, account of options. Descriptive work enables us to better understand human agency and provides a benchmark against which the demandingness of normative accounts of decision-making and rationality can be measured. Descriptive work on options and decision set generation is scarce (beyond Kalis, Kaiser, & Mojzich 2013; & Phillips, Morris, & Cushman 2019; for normative work, see Smith 2010; Hedden 2012; Jeppsson 2018; Chappell 2008). To remedy this, this paper develops a systematic account of decision set constituents and their generation that is consistent with empirical work across the cognitive sciences. To my knowledge, this is the first systematic attempt to do so.

Inkeri Koskinen

VERTAISARVIOINTI TAITEELLISESSA TUTKIMUKSESSA

Miten tutkimusala, joka torjuu ajatuksen jaetuista tiedollisista arviointikriteereistä, pystyy julkaisujen vertaisarviointiin? Lähestyn kysymystä tapaustutkimuksen avulla. Aineistoni koostuu erään taiteellisen tutkimuksen vertaisarvioidun julkaisun submitioista, vertaisarviointilauseunnoista ja toimituskunnan keskusteluista. Tarkastelen sitä, miten kyseinen julkaisu on ratkaissut yllä mainitun ongelman. Otan samalla osaa tieteenfilosofiseen keskusteluun vertaisarvioinnista ja tiedeyhteisöjen jakamista tiedollisista arviointikriteereistä.

Taiteellinen tutkimus täysimittaisena akateemisena alana syntyi pitkälti Bologna-prosessin ja samankaltaisten kansallisten, korkeakoulutusta yhtenäistävien tiedepoliittisten prosessien ei-aiottuna sivutuotteena. Taideoppilaitoksista tuli monissa Euroopan maissa vuosituhat

vaihteessa yliopistoja, ja ne saivat oikeuden myöntää tohtorintutkintoja. Muutos on tuottanut uudenlaisia mahdollisuuksia taiteelliseen työskentelyyn: taitelijoiden on tohtoritutkijoille suunnatun rahoituksen avulla mahdollista toteuttaa monivuotisia hankkeita, jotka eivät välttämättä sovi taiteen kentän vakiintuneiden instituutioiden rajaamiin muotoihin, siis esimerkiksi gallerioiden, teatterien tai konserttisalien odotuksiin. Samalla muutos on kuitenkin myös haastava. Siinä missä oppilaitokset aiemmin selvemmin määrittivät omat ihanteensa ja olivat kontaktissa mainittujen kaltaisiin taiteen kentän vakiintuneisiin institutionaalisiin rakenteisiin, taiteellisten tohtorintutkintojen on muutoksen myötä sovittauduttava myös tieteen kentällä vakiintuneisiin rakenteisiin. Alan erityispiirteiden vuoksi taiteellisen tutkimuksen on vaikea sopeutua moniin tieteen institutionaalisoihtuneisiin käytäntöihin, joita sen on kuitenkin institutionaalisista syistä jollain tavalla seurattava. Mitään vakiintunutta ratkaisua jännitteisiin alan luonteen ja tieteen instituutioiden välillä ei toistaiseksi ole syntynyt; taiteellista tutkimusta akateemisenä alana luonnehtiikin jatkuva alan akateemisen luonteen määrittely ja kyseenalaistaminen.

Tarkastelen yhtä tällaista ainakin toistaiseksi pysyvältä vaikuttavaa jännitettä: toisaalta taiteellinen tutkimus alana torjuu vaatimuksen alayhteisön jakamista tiedollisista arviointikriteereistä, ja toisaalta akateeminen vertaisarviointi ainakin jossain määrin perustuu oletukselle alayhteisön jakamista tiedollisista arviointikriteereistä.

Ajatus alayhteisön jakamista tiedollisista arviointikriteereistä herättää taiteellisen tutkimuksen alalla vastustusta, koska vaikka taiteellinen työskentely ymmärretään tutkimukselliseksi, sen yleisesti halutaan olevan päämääriltään avointa. Tekemisen tapojen ajatellaan kehittyvän työskentelyprosessin aikana vapaasti ja kenties hyvinkin idiosynkraattisesti. Tieteen arviointiin kehitetyt metriikat, vakiintuneet tutkimusmenetelmät ja niihin liittyvät jaetut arviointikriteerit sopivat huonosti yhteen tällaisten ihanteiden kanssa (ks. esim. Locher 2011; Holert 2018). Väitöskirjoja on kuitenkin arvioitava tutkimuksena, ja tämä edellyttää jonkinlaisia kuvattavissa olevia tiedollisia arviointikriteerejä. Ja akateemisten instituutioiden rahoitusmekanismit tyypillisesti sisältävät oletuksen, että tutkimus tuottaa vertaisarvioituja julkaisuja. Taideyliopistot ovat siksi kehittäneet ohjeita taiteellisten väitöskirjojen arviointiin, ja alalle on syntynyt vertaisarvioituja julkaisuja.

Tieteessä vertaisarvioinnin tyypillisesti oletetaan perustuvan alayhteisön ainakin jossain määrin jakamille arviointikriteereille. Tieteen sosiaalisessa epistemologiassa tällaisia kriteerejä pidetään yleisesti alayhteisön toimivuuden kannalta olennaisina. Helen Longino (1990) on vaikutusvaltaisesti argumentoinut, että jaetut tiedolliset arviointikriteerit ovat yksi tiedeyhteisöjen objektiivisuutta konstituovista tekijöistä. Viimeaikaisessa tieteenfilosofisessa keskustelussa tieteellisten julkaisujen vertaisarviointikäytäntöjen ongelmista on kuitenkin empiiriseen näyttöön tukeutuen kyseenalaistettu ajatus, että tiedeyhteisöillä välttämättä olisi käytännön arviointityöhön erityisemmin vaikuttavia jaettuja tiedollisia arviointikriteerejä (ks. esim. Heesen & Kofi Bright 2021). Tähän kommenttina esitän, että vaikka tiedeyhteisöissä voi olla merkittäviäkin kiistoja siitä, mitä käytettävien arviointikriteerien tulisi olla (vrt. Rolin 2009), tutkijakunta yleisesti hyväksyy ajatuksen, että tällaisia jaettuja kriteerejä tulisi olla. Kontrasti taiteelliseen tutkimukseen on selvä: edes yksimielisyyttä jaettujen kriteerien tarpeesta tai hyväksyttävyydestä ei ole.

Työni rakentuu tapaustutkimukselle. Olen koonnut aineiston, joka koostuu erään taiteellisen tutkimuksen vertaisarvioidun julkaisun submissioista, vertaisarviointilausunnoista ja toimituskunnan keskusteluista. Tarkastelen sitä, miten lehti on pyrkinyt ratkaisemaan yllä kuvatus jännitteen. Lehti on kirjoittajaohjeilla ja vertaisarvioijille esitettävillä kysymyksillä luonut metakriteerin, joka ainakin jonkin verran yhteismitallistaa vertaisarviointia: lehteen lähetettävän submission on kyettävä osoittamaan ne kriteerit, joiden avulla sitä on arvioitava tutkimuksena. Ratkaisu ohjaa vertaisarviointia mutta antaa kuitenkin tilaa hyvin erilaisille

tavoille toteuttaa taiteellista tutkimusta. Se ei kuitenkaan ole täysin ongelmaton.

Locher, Thomas. (2011). Artistic Research: Statement by Thomas Locher. *Texte zur Kunst* June 2011: 82. Url: <https://www.textezurkunst.de/en/82/artistic-research/>.

Longino, Helen E. (1990). *Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry*. Princeton University Press.

Heesen, Remco & Bright, Liam Kofi (2021). Is Peer Review a Good Idea? *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 72 (3):635-663.

Holert, Tom. (2018). Evaluating Knowledge = Evaluating Art? Tom Holert on the Resistance to Quantification in Art and its Critical Discourses. *Texte zur Kunst*, 27.7.2018. Url: <https://www.textezurkunst.de/de/articles/evaluating-knowledge-evaluating-art/>.

Rolin, Kristina. (2009). Stakeholders or experts? On the ambiguous implications of public participation in science. In J. Van Bouwel (Ed.), *The social sciences and democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 62–82.

Simo Kyllönen

EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY AND MORAL DEFERENCE

According to the epistemic theories of democracy, it is the epistemic virtues of democracy that justify the authority of democracy over other fair procedures. In its most stringent form, an epistemic theory of democracy claims that democratic procedures are able to discover the correct procedure-independent answer to the political questions. According to this so-called correctness theory, we generally have an obligation to comply with democratically produced decisions, because those decisions are correct. The correctness theory leads, however, to the results that are highly controversial: Those who disagreed with the decision, e.g., those in the minority, must now surrender their earlier judgment to the democratic process.

This requirement of deference is in stark opposition to what most democratic theorists believe. John Rawls, for instance, writes in *A Theory of Justice* that “while citizens normally submit their conduct to democratic authority, that is, recognize the outcome of a vote as establishing a binding rule, other things equal, they do not submit their judgement to it”. Hence, some epistemic theories of democracy have tried to avoid the result that would require deference. David Estlund (2008) has defended an account of epistemic proceduralism according to which democratic procedures are fallible but have a tendency to produce correct decisions. This allows those who were in the minority to disagree with the outcome while at the same time to hold the outcome authoritative because it results from a fair procedure that has a modest epistemic tendency. Other epistemic theorists are more ready to accept deference under certain epistemic conditions. Recently, Fabienne Peter (2023) has argued that deference is required whenever there is a decisive epistemic authority—that is, there is a unified and robust body of evidence and identifiable expertise on the main political question of what the right decision is.

In this paper we explore deference in epistemic democracy. We argue that the deference under appropriate epistemic conditions is plausible but only as impure deference (McGrath 2009), that is, regarding the non-moral information relevant for the decision. For instance, if S has reason to believe the epistemic authority is better in fulfilling relevant epistemic virtues, like freedom from bias and alertness about morally relevant non-moral details of the matter, then S has a reason to defer. But S’s deference bears on the moral judgement regarding the political decision, only if S knows the epistemic authority shares with her the same moral sensibility and understanding about fundamental moral values of the decision.

Moreover, we suggest, that the impure understanding of the deference supports a more general view regarding the role of epistemic authority in democracy. We argue that the role is purely instrumental and works only by assuming moral authority relations that already ground

the political authority of the democratic decisions in the first place. The genuine ground of decisions' political authority and their ability to make binding requirements on us is essentially grounded in citizens' reciprocal authority to make valid claims of one another and hold others' and oneself accountable for complying with those claims. Since decisive epistemic authorities can help us in being answerable to others, we have a reason to impurely defer to them. However, this modest requirement of impure deference is well in line with the tenets of democratic theorists: normally we submit our conduct to democratic authority (due to its moral legitimacy), but we submit our judgement to it only if (a) we have reason to believe the democratic process is epistemically better than each of us alone to fulfil relevant epistemic virtues (e.g. freedom from bias, alertness about morally relevant non-moral details etc.) in gathering information; and (b) the process is participated by experts/our peer citizens who share with us the same moral sensibility and understanding about the fundamental moral values.

Arto Laitinen

"It is good, that...". On von Wright's Varieties of Goodness.

This talk examines von Wright's views on the varieties of goodness, and defends the following claims:

1. Von Wright's six varieties can be grouped in three groups: Two varieties concern goodness as a K (instrumental/equipmental, technical). Three varieties concerns states of humans (health, welfare, happiness). One concerns causal efficiency in bringing about other good (von Wright calls it utilitarian; normally called instrumental).
2. The most important variety of goodness, expressible in sentences of the form "it is good that..." is missing from this list. Arguably, von Wright's passing discussions about "wanted in itself" and "resultant value" are about goodness in that very sense, so it would have deserved a place among the varieties.
3. The kind of goodness is what is traditionally discussed as "intrinsic", "non-instrumental", "final" or "reason-giving" value. The debate about subjectivism, objectivism or eliminativism concerning reason-giving final value will need a concept; von Wright's discussion of "wanted in itself" is related to this but admits only of subjectivist versions.
4. The goodness expressed in "good, that..."-sentences is arguably the goodness or value of states of affairs (or "states"). von Wright's discussion of "resultant value" can be seen as aiming at this.
5. Although in principle, this could be seen as one more variety of goodness alongside others, it is better to see it as the value-aspect in any of the forms; thus it threatens to collapse the idea of "varieties of goodness" in an interesting way (the goodness in all the varieties is perhaps the same after all).

Markus Lammenranta

Usko ja järki

Uskon järkevyyks riippuu toisaalta uskon ja toisaalta järjen luonteesta. Perinteisesti uskolla on ymmärretty uskonnollista uskomusta, tyypillisesti uskomusta, että Jumala on olemassa. Uskon järkevyydessä on tällöin kysymys tämän uskomuksen järkevyydestä. Uskomuksen järkevyydellä on puolestaan tarkoitettu tiedollista järkevyyttä eli sitä, onko uskomuksen puolesta riittävästi evidenssiä. Siksi keskustelu on perinteisesti kohdistunut Jumalan olemassaoloa tukeviin ja vastustaviin argumentteihin. Tällaisten argumenttien hyvydestä ei ole filosofien keskuudessa kuitenkaan minkäänlaista yksimielisyyttä. Lisäksi tavallinen uskova ihminen ei edes tunne näitä argumentteja, minkä takia hänen uskonsa järkevyyks ei voi perustua argumentteihin.

Näiden ongelmien takia suositaan on kasvattanut ns. reformoitu tieto-oppi (Alston, Plantinga), jonka mukaan usko voi olla tiedollisesti järkevää ilman argumentteja. Sen mukaan

jotkut Jumalaa koskevat uskomukset ovat perususkomuksia, joiden järkevyyttä ei perustu päättelyyn muista uskomuksista. Näiden uskomusten järkevyyttä perustuu siihen, että ne ovat jonkin sellaisen älyllisen kyvyn tai prosessin synnyttämiä, joka tuottaa luotettavalla tavalla uskomuksia Jumalasta suoraan uskonnollisten kokemusten perusteella. Vaikka tällainen näkemys sallii järkevät uskonnolliset uskomukset joillekin sellaisille uskoville ihmisille, jotka eivät tunne filosofisia argumentteja, se sulkee ulkopuolelle ne, joilla ei ole asianmukaisia kokemuksia tai jotka epäilevät uskonnollisten kokemusten luotettavuutta.

Pragmatistit, kuten Pascal, James ja Rorty, ovat puolustaneet uskon praktista järkevyyttä. Heidän mukaansa uskomus, että Jumala on olemassa, voi olla järkvy, koska tällaisella uskomuksella voi olla uskojalle itselleen ja muille hyviä käytännöllisiä seurauksia. Tämän näkemyksen keskeinen ongelma on se, että uskomus ei näytä voivan perustua praktisiin tekijöihin. Koska uskomisen tähtää totuuteen, emme ainakaan tietoisesti pysty muodostamaan uskomuksia sellaisten seikkojen perusteella, jotka eivät liity uskomusten totuuteen. Jos tietoisesti harkitsemme uskomisen järkevyyttä, otamme huomioon vain seikkoja, jotka puhuvat uskomuksen totuuden tai epätotuuden puolesta, eli uskomusta tukevan ja vastustavan evidenssin. Näyttää siltä, että vain evidenssi (tai jokin muu totuuteen liittyvä seikka) voi tehdä uskomuksesta järkevän.

Tällaisten perinteisen uskonkäsityksen ongelmien takia on viime aikoina yleistynyt vaihtoehtoinen ei-doksastinen käsitys uskon luonteesta (esim. Alston, Audi, Buchak, Howart-Snyder, Jackson, Kvanvig, McKaughan, Pojman, Schellenberg). Propositionaalinen usko (propositional faith) ei sen mukaan vaadi uskomusta. Usko on kompleksinen tila, johon kuuluu positiivinen (konatiivinen) asenne proposition totuuteen ja uskomusta heikompi kognitiivinen osatekijä, kuten hyväksyminen tai olettaminen. Olennaista on, ettei tämä vaadi niin korkeaa vakuuttuneisuuden astetta kuin uskomisen eikä siksi vaadi myöskään niin vahvaa evidenssia. Koska hyväksyminen on tahdonalaista, proposition voi hyväksyä todeksi myös pelkästään praktisin perustein. Päätösteoriasta seuraa, että tällainen usko voi hyvin olla järkvyä: Jos joku haluaa hyvin vahvasti sitä, että Jumala olisi olemassa, sen hyväksymisellä, että näin on, voi olla korkeampi odotusarvo kuin hyväksymättä jättämisellä, vaikka hän olisi hyvin vähän vakuuttunut siitä, että Jumala on olemassa. Tämän näkemyksen mukaan järkvy usko sopii yhteen epäilyn kanssa. Siis myös agnostikon ja jopa ateistin usko voi olla järkvyä.

On selvää, että ei-doksastisesta näkemyksestä ja päätösteoriasta seuraa, että agnostikon ja jopa ateistin usko Jumalan olemassaoloon voi olla järkvyä. Ongelma on se, että tämä järkvyys on praktista. Vaikka agnostikko ja ateisti eivät usko, että Jumala on olemassa, he hyväksyvät sen, että Jumala on olemassa, ja toimivat ikään kuin uskoisivat, että Jumala on olemassa, koska tällaisella toiminnalla on hyviä praktisia seurauksia. Koska proposition hyväksyminen on kuitenkin sen hyväksymistä todeksi, hyväksymiselle voi olla myös tiedollisia perusteita eli evidenssiä. Praktisten perusteiden lisäksi agnostikolla on tiedollisia perusteita olla hyväksymättä Jumalan olemassaoloa. Ateistilla taas on perusteita hyväksyä, ettei Jumalaa ole olemassa. Jos hyväksymiselle voi siis olla sekä praktisia että tiedollisia perusteita ja nämä voivat vetää eri suuntiin, mitä agnostikon ja ateistin pitäisi kaiken kaikkiaan (sekä praktiset että tiedolliset perusteet huomioon ottaen) hyväksyä? Voiko agnostikon ja ateistin usko loppujen lopuksi olla järkvyä, vai vaatiiko järkvy usko kuitenkin uskomuksen, kuten doksastinen näkemys olettaa? Yritän vastata tähän keskeiseen uskonfilosofian eli pistologian kysymykseen tai ainakin tarkastella kriittisesti mahdollisia vastauksia

Kaisa Luoma

Mikä tekee terapeutisesta selfhelpistä poliittisesti passivoivaa?

Yhdistän itseapu- ja elämäntaitokirjallisuuden empiiristä analyysiä poliittisen toimijuuden ennakkoehtojen filosofiseen tarkasteluun. Tarkastelen selfhelpin rakentamaa itsesuhdetta erityisesti siitä näkökulmasta, millaisia tapoja henkilökohtaisen politisoimiseen ja politisoitumiseen se sallii tai sulkee pois. Vaikka tekemäni havainnot enimmäkseen tukevatkin usein esitettyä väitettä selfhelpin poliittisesta passivoivuudesta ja ideologisesta sopeuttavuudesta, tämä epäpoliittisuus ei nähdäkseni selity sillä lajityypin yksilökeskeisellä perusasetelmalla, että selfhelp pyrkii antamaan yksittäiselle yksilölle elämänohjeita, joita tämä voi soveltaa yksityiselämässään riippumatta siitä miten muut toimivat. Aineistoni selfhelpin poliittikkavihamielisyys on sekä syvemmillä että kontingentimpaa: osoitan, että se ohjaa lukijaansa oppimaan pois monista sellaisista arkisista ja perustavista maailman kokemisen ja tulkitsemisen tavoista, joiden varaan poliittista toimijuutta on totuttu rakentamaan.

Olen erottanut aineistostani kolme päädiskurssia: välineellisen rationaalisuuden diskurssin, mindfulness-diskurssin ja terapeutin diskurssin. Artikkelini keskittyy niistä yhteen, terapeutin diskurssiin. Terapeutista diskurssia erottaa muista sen ihmiskäsitys, joka uskoo itsetuntemuksen ja rehellisen itsetutkiskelun arvoon. Yksilöllisestä tiedostamattomasta aineksesta tietoiseksi tuleminen ajatellaan voivan itsessään muuttaa yksilön haluja ja käyttäytymistä, ja tunteilla nähdään olevan keskeinen tiedollinen merkitys tässä prosessissa. Väitän, että nämä piirteet tekevät terapeutisesta diskurssista periaatteessa lupaavan lähtökohdan poliittiselle – ja erityisesti identiteettipoliittiselle – järjestäytymiselle. Tämän potentiaalin toteutumista rajoittavat ennen kaikkea tietyt ristiriitapakoiset ajattelumallit ja pyrkimykset, jotka hallitsevat aineistoni selfhelpiä kokonaisuudessaan ja saavat eksplisiittisimmät muotoilunsa mindfulnessiksi kutsutussa ajattelukehyksessä, joka tietoisena läsnäolon harjoitusten kautta auttaa soveltajaansa olemaan ottamatta omia tunteitaan tai ajatuksiaan ”liian” vakavasti. Havainnollistan esimerkein, miten vallitsevan mindfulness-muodin mukaiset käsitteet ja ajattelutavat strategisissa kohdin ujuttautuvat myös terapeutin diskurssin sisään muuntaen tiedontuotantoon ja kommunikointiin liittyviä kysymyksiä pelkiksi mielen- ja elämänhallinnan kysymyksiksi.

Viittaan artikkelissani kolmeen ideaalityypiseen tapaan, jolla henkilökohtainen voi kääntyä poliittiseksi: yksilöt voivat organisoitua joko jaettujen intressien, jaettujen arvojen tai yhteisen identiteetin ympärille. Tarkastelen terapeutin diskurssin politisoitumisen epäonnistumista ennen kaikkea identiteettipoliittisen järjestäytymisen näkökulmasta. Nykykeskusteluissa identiteettipoliitiikan käsitteellä tyypillisesti viitataan sellaiseen polarisoivaan politiikan tekemisen tapaan, jossa eri ryhmät vetoavat ehdottomaan oikeuteensa ilmentää omaa identiteettiään sellaisenaan ja pyrkivät näin asettavat näin tietyt poliittiset konfliktit rationaalisen arvokeskustelun ja intressien yhteensovittamista koskevien neuvotteluiden ulkopuolelle. Tarkastelussani kuitenkin suhteutan terapeutista selfhelpiä hyvin toisenlaiseen identiteettipoliitiikan ideaalityypiin, jonka ainekset löytyvät yhteisöllisen tiedontuotannon ajatukseen nojaavasta feministisestä teoretisoinnista. Tällaisen identiteettipoliittisen järjestäytymismallin juuret ovat toisen aallon feminismiin kuuluneissa feministisissä tiedostamisryhmissä, joissa toimijat yhdessä erittelivät yksilöllisiä kokemuksiaan löytääkseen niistä ne elementit, jotka heitä yhdistävät ja joille on perusteltua vaatia ilmenemistilaa ja sosiaalista tunnustusta. Vaikeasti kielellistettäviä kokemuksia pyritään sanoittamaan ja sitä kautta vähitellen vapautumaan sen vallitsevan ideologian otteesta, jonka sorretut tiedostavat itsekin osittain sisäistäneensä. Mallissa terapeutin ja poliittinen yhdistyvät, kun sen ytimessä oleva dialoginen tiedontuotantoprosessi palvelee yhtä aikaa molempia tavoitteita. Analysoidessaan yhteiskunnallista tiedostamatonta ideologisen itsetutkiskelun kautta voi myös käyttää pitkälti samoja kykyjä kuin omien tiedostamattomien defenssien terapeutisessa

itsetutkiskelussa, jolloin ideologiakriittinen asennoituminen ympäröivään yhteiskuntaan näyttäytyy terapeuttisen itsesuhteen luontaisena jatkumona.

Vaikka tämänkaltaisen henkilökohtaista politisoivan identiteettipolitiikan ajatus onkin totuttu yhdistämään erityisesti tiettyihin sosiaalisiin kategorioihin, jotka kytkeytyvät laaja-alaisen rakenteellisen sorron mekanismeihin, saman mallin mukaan voi lähteä tarkastelemaan mitä tahansa vaikeasti sanallistettavia epäsuoran syrjinnän kokemuksia. Osoitan, että aineistoni terapeuttisessa selfhelpissä olisi periaatteessa aineksia tällaiseen identiteetilähtöiseen politisoitumiseen, mutta myös tekijöitä, jotka sen estävät.

Toissijaisesti tarkastelen terapeuttista diskurssia myös arvoperustaisen politiikan näkökulmasta ja kysyn, onko osoitettavissa jokin sellainen "terapeuttinen arvomaailma", jota se eksplisiittisesti asettuu puolustamaan tai implisiittisesti luo ja uusintaa. Erittelen ensin, missä määrin ja millä tavoin aineistoni voi tulkita tukevan yhteiskunnan terapisoitumista sellaisena kuin terapiakulttuurin käsitteen tunnetuksi tehnyt Frank Furedi asian ymmärtää. Vaikka juuri furedilaisesti ymmärrettyä terapiakulttuuria tukevia elementtejä löytyy niukalti, väitän että aineistoni kontekstissa terapeuttisella diskurssilla on omat arvonsa. Selkein aineistoni sisäinen moraalinen jännite muodostuu juuri totuudentavoittelun, rehellisyyden ja niihin perustuvien ihmisten välisten yhteyksien itseisarvoa korostavan terapeuttisen selfhelpin ja lukijan psyykkisen hyvinvoinnin (onnellisuuden, merkityksellisyyden) maksimointiin suuntautuvan elämänhallintaselvityksen välille. Selfhelp ei voisi pysyä epäpoliittisena, jollei se näkisi paljon vaivaa piilottaakseen ja selittääkseen pois tätä ristiriitaa.

Aineistoni koostuu Suomessa bestseller-listoille vuosina 2018–2022 nousseista suomenkielisistä elämäntaito- ja itseapukirjoista (62kpl).

Kirjallisuutta:

Brunila, Kristiina, Esko Harni, Antti Saari, ja Hanna Ylöstalo. *Terapeuttinen valta: onnellisuuden ja hyvinvoinnin jännitteitä 2000-luvun Suomessa*. Tampere: Vastapaino, 2021.

Frawley, Daniel Nehring, Ashley. "Mindfulness as a self-help fad: The mindfulness industry, popular psychological knowledge, and the sociological imagination 1". Teoksessa *The Routledge International Handbook of Global Therapeutic Cultures*. Routledge, 2020.

Fukuyama, Francis. *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*. First edition. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.

Furedi, Frank. *Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age*. London, New York: Taylor and Francis Ltd. : Routledge, 2013.

Hämäläinen, Nora. *The Making of the Good Person: Self-Help, Ethics and Philosophy*. 1. p. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory. Milton: Routledge, 2023.

Illouz, Eva. *Saving the Modern Soul: Therapy, Emotions, and the Culture of Self-Help*. First Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.

Young, Iris Marion. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1990.

Vili Lähteenmäki

Ideas all the way down

The most gripping scholarly discussion of the past several decades concerning the status of ideas in early modern philosophy has revolved around representationalism about extramental reality and the challenge it poses: whether or not so many early modern thinkers, Cartesians and Lockeans alike, are susceptible to a 'veil of ideas' which severs our cognitive and epistemic relation with the world.

My talk discusses a feature of theories of ideas, particularly within Cartesian and Lockean thinking, which has been overshadowed by the 'veil of ideas' discussion and received much less scholarly attention. What Locke says in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* about the general role of ideas is widely believed to express an essentially Cartesian principle shared by many early modern philosophers:

'For since the Things, the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides it self, present to the Understanding, 'tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are Ideas.'

Regardless of which version of representationalism is believed to be true of a given early modern philosopher, and whether or not it is believed to put us in an unhappy cognitive situation, it is commonly accepted that the mind enjoys an unmediated cognitive access to its own acts and existence—just as Locke seems to be summarising in the above quotation. Nevertheless, the immediacy of the mind's relation to itself is strikingly seldom explicated and argued for.

The aim of my talk is to go against the grain and show that it is not unproblematic for the early moderns to grant non-ideational self-cognition. One reason is straightforwardly textual. Despite the above statement, Locke does not explicate the alleged immediate connection of the mind to itself, much less offers it as a ground for any philosophical aim of his, while he does repeatedly point out that all forms of mentality involve ideas. Strikingly, given his commitment to absolute certainty about our own existence, the same holds for Descartes. He neither ever says that this certainty is grounded on an immediate relation to our own mind, nor even says that the immediate relation is there.

Another reason is systematic. These philosophers, and many of their contemporaries, are philosophically unmotivated to grant two kinds of cognitive access: ideational regarding extramental things and non-ideational regarding intramental things. Granting two accesses is in itself problematic because it risks being superfluous. But it also involves a further complication. Our mental life is unified in a way that it is not apparent to us that we cognize external objects ideationally and our own mental acts directly with no involvement of ideas. As a natural response, we might think that this is because consciousness characterizes all our cognition: in so far as we are conscious of our perceptions—be they inner or outer directed—we are not in a position to tell whether an idea is involved or not. While this might plausibly explain why the alleged bifurcated nature of cognition is psychologically obscured to us, it of course does nothing to alleviate the bifurcation itself. But it does mean assigning consciousness too with a double role. Consciousness must be capable of having things of two different kinds as its object (or, if one prefers, being directed at two different kinds of things): representations (ideas of things) and things in themselves (the mind/mental acts). These are my reasons, which I will flesh out in my talk, for thinking that there is a sustained line of thought among early modern philosophers that ideas go all the way down to the relations the mind has with itself. Hence, there is no commitment to immediate, non-ideational cognition

and that instead there is a commitment to a single model, the ideational model, of how cognition works.

Arto Mutanen ja Ilpo Halonen

Selittämisestä ja ymmärtämisestä

Von Wright (1970) esittää, että tieteellisellä teorianmuodostuksella on kaksi päätavoitetta, ennustaminen ja selittäminen. Selitettäessä tavoite on jonkin jo tapahtuneen asian tekeminen ymmärrettäväksi, joka voidaan ymmärtää eri tavoin. Von Wright erottelee, Eino Kailaa seuraten, Aristoteleen ja Galilein perinteen, joista edellinen painottaa teleologista tai finalistista selitystä ja jälkimmäinen kausaalis-mekanistista selitystä. Kausaalis-mekanistisessa selityksessä selitettävä ilmiö selitetään joidenkin lakien ja tiettyjen muiden asiantilojen avulla. Hempel (1942) antoi tälle eksplisiittisen muotoilun. Tämä herätti laajaa keskustelua tieteellisestä selittämisestä. Von Wright (1970, 294) toteaa, että ”näyttää melkein kohtalon ivalta, että positivistinen selitysteoria sai ehkä täydellisimmän ilmaisunsa sellaisen aihepiirin yhteydessä, johon tämä teoria kaikkein huonoimmin soveltuu”. Von Wrightin (1970) erottelu aristoteelisen ja galileilaisen tradition välillä luonnehtii samalla myös metodologista eroa ymmärtävän ja selittävän tieteen välillä.

Hempelin selitysmalli on luonteeltaan deduktiivinen, jota Hempel tosin myöhemmin laajensi. Tämä lähestymistapa osoittautui kiinnostavaksi myös tarkasteltaessa teorioiden välistä selittämissuhdetta (reduktiivinen selittäminen), jolla on merkitystä tarkasteltaessa teorioiden välistä selityssuhdetta. Toisaalta voidaan tarkastella sitä, miten erilaisia asioita teoria pystyy selittämään, jolloin tarkastelun kohteeksi tulee unifikointin käsite. (Kts. Niiniluoto 2016; Niiniluoto & Tuomela 1973.)

Deduktiivinen lähestymistapa ei kuitenkaan luo selitystä etsivälle ymmärrystä miksi selitettävä asia tapahtui. Ymmärrys ei ole vain käsillä olevan asian tuntemista, vaan ”kyky tehdä riippuvuussuhteita koskevan tiedon perusteella oikeaan osuviä mitä jos -päätelmiä kohteesta. Toisinaan nämä päätelmät koskevat mahdollista tulevaisuutta: ne kertovat, mitä tapahtuisi, jos x.” (Ylikoski 2018, 46). Kontrafaktuaalisuus tuo esiin, että ”lainomaisen yhteyden tuntomerkinä on välttämättömyys eikä yleisyys” (von Wright 1970, 302), joten tieteellinen laki jo itsessään viittaa myös mahdollisiin asiantiloihin.

Ymmärtäessään selityksen henkilö tietää, miksi selitettävä asia on tapahtunut. Tiedolliset käsitteet ovat luonteeltaan modaalisia eli ne viittaavat vaihtoehtoihin asiantiloihin (Hintikka 2007). Selityksen etsiminen ei ole hempeiläinen looginen kysymys, vaan käytännöllinen tiedollinen kysymys. Selityksen etsijä haluaa saada tietää, miksi selitettävä asia tapahtuu. Formaali looginen tarkastelu antaa tietyn rakenteellisen kuvauksen, mutta tiedon hankkiminen on käytännöllinen prosessi (Salmon 2006), jossa tieto rakentuu, kuten jo Platon dialogissaan ”Menon” tuo esiin.

Ylikoski (2018) tarkastelee selittämistä tiettyihin mekanismeihin vedoten, joissa kysymys on selitystä etsivien miksi-kysymysten taustalla olevien kuinka-kysymysten esittämisestä. Tällöin edellä luonnehdittu kontrafaktuaalinen tieto kontekstualisoidaan relevanttien kontrastien avulla. Näiden kontrastien avulla taustalla olevat mekanismit voidaan eksplikoida ja siten selitystä etsivä miksi-kysymys saa kontekstuaalisesti konklusiivisen vastauksen. ”Kun ymmärrämme mekanismin, tiedämme enemmän kuin kahden asian välisen kontrafaktuaalisen riippuvuuden: tiedämme myös, miksi ja missä olosuhteissa tuo riippuvuussuhde vallitsee.” (Ylikoski 2018)

Näin ymmärtämisen ja selittämisen välinen jännite voidaan ylittää tuomalla esiin selittämiseen ja laajemmin tieteellisen päättelyyn liittyviä piirteitä, joita voidaan eksplikoida mekanismin, kontrafaktuaalisuuden ja kontrastin käsitteiden avulla.

Viime vuosikymmeninä tieteellistä selittämistä on tarkasteltu varsin erilaisista lähtökohdista.

Hempeliläistä deduktiivista lähestymistapaa on kehitelty eri tavoin. Yhtäältä ottamalla käyttöön monipuolisempia tilanteisiin soveltuvia loogisia työkaluja, kuten episteemistä logiikkaa. Toisaalta rikastuttamalla käsitteellisiä menetelmiä ilman spesifisiä loogisia työkaluja. On kuitenkin mielenkiintoista huomata, että erilaisista lähtökohdista on usein päädytty varsin samansuuntaisiin näkemyksiin.

Lähteet:

Hempel, Carl G., 1965, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science*, NY: Collier-Macmillan Limited.

Hintikka Jaakko, 2007, *Socratic Epistemology. Explorations of Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning*. Cambridge University Press.

Niiniluoto, Ilkka, 2016, *Unification and Confirmation*, *Theoria* 31.

Niiniluoto, Ilkka & Tuomela, Raimo, 1973, *Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Salmon, Wesley C., 2006, *Four Decades of Scientific Explanation*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Von Wright, 1970/2020, *Tieteenfilosofian kaksi perinnettä*, kirjassa Johan Strang & Thomas Wallgren (toim.), 2020, *Georg Henrik von Wright: modernin ajan ajattelija*, Tallinna: Gaudeamus

Ylikoski, Petri, 2018, *Selittäminen, ymmärtäminen ja kausaaliset mekanismit*, kirjassa T. Kaidesoja, T. Kankainen & P. Ylikoski (toim.), 2018, *Systä selityksiin*, Gaudeamus

Mika Perälä

How Does Aristotle Acquire the Starting Points for the Study of Akrasia?

It is controversial which method Aristotle applies in his ethics, including moral psychology. In the scholarly literature, two key alternatives are identified: the dialectical method based on reputable opinions (endoxa) (e.g., Cooper 2009), and the scientific method based on observed phenomena or facts (e.g., Karbowski 2019). I shall address this controversy by considering a case, namely how Aristotle acquires the starting points the study of akrasia in *Ethica Nicomachea* (EN) book 7.

By 'starting points', I am referring to both generic concepts and universal premises. I shall argue that even if Aristotle begins his study by setting out several relevant endoxa in EN 7.1, he proceeds to develop arguments that are not exclusively based on these endoxa. In other words, Aristotle begins with a dialectical method but ends up with a scientific one. Some premises that he adduces in the course of his study are given in more refined terms than the ones with which he began his study. Consider, for example, his distinctions between different ways of knowing and thereby between different ways of acting against knowledge (EN 7.3, 1146b31–1147a24). Note also that Aristotle distinguishes between different ways of being an akratic (EN 7.4, 1147b20–1148a2): those who act against their knowledge because of a sensual appetite (e.g., EN 7.3, 1147b2–3) and those who do so because of, e.g., anger (EN 7.6, 1149a24–25). How does Aristotle acquire these more refined terms and the premises that are composed of these terms? This is where he applies his scientific method, including *epagōgē*, or so I argue.

In EN 7, Aristotle does not refer to *epagōgē* nor does he give demonstrations, but this does not show that he does not need *epagōgē* to acquire universal premises. Surely, he needs universal premises and he could even give demonstrations. Consider persons who are akratic with respect to appetites. In their case, Aristotle could demonstrate that every akratic person acts against their knowledge because he assumes that every akratic person is subject to a strong appetite and that every person who is subject to a strong appetite acts against their knowledge. *Prima facie*, the latter premise is suspect because an enkratic person may be subject to a strong appetite, and yet she does not act against her knowledge. However, if the

premise is acquired by an inductive conversion from the premise that every person who acts against their knowledge is subject to a strong appetite, then Aristotle has a principled reason to accept it. I suggest that the demonstration is analogous with the one given in APr. 2.23 (for a helpful study of this chapter, see, e.g., Hintikka 1980). Thus understood, epagōgē is not only a means of acquiring universal premises for a demonstration, but also a means of specifying the terms used in the premises, i.e., of making sure that they are coextensive.

References

Cooper, John M. 2009. 'Nicomachean ethics VII. 1-2 : introduction, method, puzzles'. In Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle: Nicomachean ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hintikka, Jaakko 1980. 'Aristotelian Induction', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 34 (3), 422–439.

Karbowsky, Joseph 2019. Aristotle's Method in Ethics. Cambridge University Press.

Sami Pihlström

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND REAL GENERALS (abstract)

Nuclear war is an apocalyptic scenario. Yet it might be suggested, not entirely implausibly, that the reality of this threat, as a possibility, has (so far) prevented a nuclear war, and thus a third world war, from taking place, saving hundreds of millions of lives. Nuclear deterrence is a deeply troubling phenomenon needing both ethical and metaphysical analysis.

This paper begins by acknowledging, with Michael Walzer (1992), that nuclear weapons “explode” the just war theory. It can never be justified or excusable to use nuclear weapons. How can it, then, be permissible to threaten to use them (as many people, including respected political leaders, believe it is)? For example, by joining the Nato, Finland and Sweden moved under the “nuclear umbrella” of their allies, hoping that this threat prevents military aggression. Claiming that this was simply ethically wrong is an extremist position implying that the mere existence of alliances like Nato is wrong.

Insofar as potentiality depends on actuality, the potentiality involved in nuclear deterrence may be argued to be immoral (unjustified, impermissible) if actually using nuclear weapons is. However, the “reality” of nuclear deterrence may be analyzed in terms of Charles S. Peirce’s metaphysics of scholastic realism postulating “real generals” (e.g., habits, dispositions, possibilities), arguing that this is a sufficiently rich ontology to make sense of deterrence acknowledging both its moral dubiousness and political necessity. (For key writings by Peirce on “real generals”, see Peirce 1992-98.) In a Peircean sense, the “would-be” threat to use nuclear weapons in certain (extreme) situations can be “real” even if nuclear weapons are never and will never be used. Its reality is intended to guarantee the non-actuality of any nuclear strike. A mere possibility can have such ontological power because “generals” or “would-be’s” are “real”, while not existing as concrete particulars. However, even though it is false to claim that nuclear weapons could not play an ontologically significant role unless actually used (indeed, they can genuinely prevent nuclear war), nothing guarantees success. Accidents, for example, are “real possibilities”, too, and might actualize a nuclear catastrophe.

This discussion provides no independent argument for the Peircean reality of generals.

However, another pragmatist resource can be brought to bear on the matter. Utilizing Morton White's (e.g., 2002) holistic pragmatism, it may be argued that we may, when assessing our holistic system of beliefs that contains both factual/descriptive and normative elements, legitimately revise even our metaphysical beliefs (e.g., regarding the reality of "generals") insofar as such revisions are needed to accommodate ethically (or generally normatively) motivated beliefs, or evidence supporting such beliefs. The reality of generals might be defended on the grounds that it enables us to make sense of nuclear deterrence, explaining why it is not obviously impermissible to threaten to use nuclear weapons even if it is (and is acknowledged to be) always impermissible to use them. Accordingly, given the political and thus, in a broad sense, ethical necessity of nuclear deterrence, we may need to revise our ontology to include real possibilities. Otherwise, we cannot accommodate our normative beliefs about the necessity to respond to a hostile threat by a counter-threat, while maintaining that the actual use of nuclear weapons is always (deeply) wrong. This issue will be critically discussed in the paper as a case study illuminating the methodology of holistic pragmatism.

Finally, based on this analysis indebted to Peirce's and White's different versions of pragmatism, the paper will briefly comment on Raimond Gaita's (2004) critical reflection on pacifism. Gaita argues that our "unease" with pacifists is that they are not "fully amongst us" in the sense that they fail to acknowledge that we "will do evil" (and know we will) if the constitutive conditions of our political communality are threatened. We may ask whether this argument could be rephrased, in Peircean terms, as referring to the fact that we "would do evil" – especially in the case of nuclear weapons. If so, then the relation between general pacifism and specific "nuclear pacifism" will have to be reconsidered.

References

- Gaita, Raimond (2004 [1991]). *Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception*. Rev. ed. London and New York: Routledge.
- Peirce, Charles S. (1992-98). *The Essential Peirce*, 2 vols. The Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Walzer, Michael (1992 [1977]). *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 2nd ed. New York: Basic Books.
- White, Morton (2002). *A Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Corrado Pirroddi

Epidemics and pandemics as social pathologies. A critical-naturalist proposal

Epidemics and pandemics are generated by a natural process of spillover and zoonosis but spread among humans through social factors like interpersonal relations, travel, commerce, and war. Are epidemics and pandemics biological trigger factors of social pathologies like anomie, disruption of productive and reproductive societal functions, widespread intolerance, witch-hunting, and scapegoating? Could they be only "symptoms" of emerging or chronic social pathologies? Instead, are epidemics and pandemics social pathologies tout court, whose etiology lies in dysfunctions and illnesses of societal relationships, standardized practices, internalized customs, and habits?

At the same time, we must consider that humans have developed a certain tolerance to microparasites, like intestine bacteria, that do not negatively affect humankind. However, such a mutual relationship of harmlessness between the host and parasite is not a necessary and inevitable result. Some human parasites, like the malaria plasmodium, continue harming humans badly after centuries of coexistence. Is there a natural equilibrium between hosts and microparasites? What are the social consequences of an eventual rupture of this equilibrium? The paper discusses whether natural phenomena like epidemics and pandemics of communicable diseases can be interpreted as social pathologies. While answering the previous

questions, the manuscript tries to define a set of criteria—rupture of biological normativity and evaluation of epidemics' social impact—that can help determine in which circumstances such natural phenomena fall under the label of "social pathologies."

It will be asserted that the more bars a specific epidemic disease satisfies, showing socio-pathological characteristics (SPC), the more the epidemic pathology is social. For instance, on the one hand, an influenza epidemic can hardly be labeled as a social pathology. However, on the other hand, the Black Death can undoubtedly be considered a severe social pathology that had an enormous impact on the demography of Europe, social relationships, religion, political and public institutions, and redistribution of wealth.

In providing such an account of epidemics and pandemics as social pathologies, the paper aspires to follow the spirit of the Critical Naturalism Manifesto. According to the latter critical approaches to social pathologies, injustices, and domination should always be intended as a learning process, which proceeds in a fallibilist way and considering the many ways we can conceive natural entities and processes. This attitude means not only accepting the conceptual vagueness of social pathology. It also implies that evaluations concerning the status of epidemic diseases in terms of social pathologies are always revisable. In this respect, the paper will try to emphasize how, when applied to epidemic diseases, the word "social" in the expression "social pathology" involves a matter of degree. Furthermore, it indicates a spectrum according to which different epidemic diseases can have a distinct social relevance and socio-pathological nature.

In the first part, the paper will briefly depict the current status of debate around the idea of social pathology, underlining the main problems and the limits regarding the application of the concept to phenomena such as epidemics and pandemics. In the second part, the paper will introduce the work of William McNeill and John Snowden for defying the two conditions that might help us determine the socio-pathological nature of natural phenomena like epidemics. Finally, in the third part, through a short comparative analysis, the paper will explain why qualifying epidemics and pandemics as social pathology is always a matter of degree and nuance.

Mikko Puumala

Onko "murha" yliampuvaa? Arkimoraali ja eläimiä koskeva kielenkäyttö

Tässä artikkelissa tarkastelen eläimiä koskevaa kielenkäyttöä arkimoraalin näkökulmasta. Erityisenä tarkastelun kohteena on niin sanottu eettinen ekstensionismi ja sen moraaliteoreettiset implikaatiot arkimoraalille (ordinary morality). Ekstensionismi on eläinetiikan ja laajemmin ympäristöetiikan aloilla yksi yleisimpiä strategioita perustella ei-ihmisolioiden moraalinen status. Sen keskeinen ajatus on, että meidän tulisi ulottaa jo olemassa olevia moraaliteorioita, -periaatteita ja -arvostelmia koskemaan myös muita kuin ihmisiä. Esimerkiksi filosofi Peter Singer on ulottanut utilitaristisen teorian koskemaan myös eläimiä. Olennaista on niin sanotut moraalisen merkityksellisyyden (moral considerability) kriteerit, joiden perusteella moraalisen tarkastelun kohteita valitaan. Jos esimerkiksi kriteeri moraalille merkityksellisyydelle on tuntoisuus, silloin kaikkia tunteisia olentoja kohtaan tulisi soveltaa samoja utilitaristisia periaatteita. Muutoin kyseessä on lajisyrjintä eli spesismi. Ekstensionistisessä strategiassa etuna on sen tehokkuus. Voimme hyödyntää olemassa olevia, hyvin perusteltuja ja koeteltuja moraaliteorioita ja soveltaa niitä uusiin kohteisiin. Etiikkaa ei siten tarvitse perustaa uudelleen esimerkiksi eläinten kohdalla.

Tämän strategian haasteena on kuitenkin se, että perinteiset moraaliteoriat ja moraaliperiaatteet kohtaavat epäintuitiivisia tai teoreettisesti haastavia tilanteita, joissa ihmisten ja muiden olentojen intressit ovat ristiriidassa. Tässä paperissa keskityn kielenkäytön haasteisiin, erityisesti moraalisesti latautuneisiin käsitteisiin kuten "murha". Tyypillisesti murhalla tarkoitetaan toisen henkilön tarkoituksellista tappamista, jolloin voimme ekstensionistisesti ylettää "henkilöyden" koskemaan myös muita kuin ihmisiä. Näin ollen

eläinten tarkoituksellinen tappaminen voitaisiin tietyissä tilanteissa laskea murhaksi. Eläinoikeusliikkeellä onkin vanha iskulause "meat is murder", liha on murhaa. Tällä on kuitenkin ongelmallisia seurauksia, sillä eläinten tarkoituksellinen tappaminen on erittäin yleistä ja lisäksi se on kytkeytynyt kokonaisuutena teollisuuden alana talousjärjestelmiimme. Vieraslajien hävittäminen, metsästys, ja eläinteollisuus näyttäytyvät hyvin eri valossa, mikäli eläinten tarkoituksellinen tappaminen lasketaan murhaksi, sillä murhaa pidetään kaikista vakavimpana tappamisen muotona, ja sellaisiin moraaliyhteisön jäseniin, jotka katsotaan murhaajiksi, sovelletaan erilaisia rangaistuksia. Jos suurimmassa osassa yhteiskuntia suurin osa ihmisistä on jollain tavalla yhteydessä murhaamiseen ja hyötyy siitä, miten voimme kohdata toisemme? Toisaalta murhan käsite tuntuu osuvasti vangitsevan juuri sen moraalisen vakavuuden, joka toisten elävien, tuntoisten olentojen tarkoitukselliseen tappamiseen liittyy. Lisäksi se sopii ekstensionistiseen strategiaan, ja on siten teoreettisesti perusteltu.

Tarkastelen tätä problematiikkaa arkimoraalin ja moraalin vaativuuden näkökulmasta. Arkimoraali on eräänlainen metanormatiivinen uskomusjärjestelmä, joka asettaa reunaehdoita sille, millaisia sisältöjä varsinaisissa moraaliteorioissa voi olla. Esimerkiksi utilitarismia on syytetty siitä, että se aiheuttaa yksilöille moraalisesti ylivaativia velvoitteita eikä jätä yksilöille riittävästi toiminnan vaihtoehtoja tai rajoita sitä, mitä moraalin nimissä on sallittua tehdä. Utilitarismin kriitikot tuntevat viittaavan tällöin johonkin arkimoraalin kaltaiseen – se ei vastaa käsitystä siitä, mitä tavanomaisilta ihmisiltä voidaan tavanomaisissa tilanteissa edellyttää. Jos ekstensionismin nojalla merkittävä osa moraaliyhteisömme jäsenistä on jollain tavalla osallisia murhaamiseen, hyötyy tästä murhaamisesta tai on suoraan katsottavissa murhaajiksi, ovat seuraukset erittäin merkittäviä. Arkimoraalisten käsitysten ja ekstensionismin välillä on siis huomionarvoinen ristiriita. Esimerkiksi eläinteollisuuden lakkauttaminen aiheuttaa monille merkittäviä kustannuksia, mikä mahdollistaa ylivaativuuskritiikin. Lisäksi, jos merkittävä osa ihmisistä on jollain tavalla syyllisiä murhaamiseen, pitäisikö heitä johdonmukaisuuden nimissä rangaista kuten murhaan syyllisiä tai osasyyllisiä yleensä rangaistaan? Jos näitä seurauksia ei halua hyväksyä, näyttäisi siltä, että joko ekstensionistinen strategia tulisi hylätä, arkimoraali tulisi hylätä, tai murhan käsitettä tai murhan seuraamuksia tulisi jollain tapaa laimentaa. Mikäli ekstensionismin katsotaan olevan teoreettisesti vahva ja perusteltu kanta, kaikki kolme vaihtoehtoa näyttävät epätydyttäviltä. Tässä artikkelissa tarkastelenkin jäljelle jäävää vaihtoehtoa, jossa moraalisesti vaativat ja radikaalitkin seuraukset hyväksytään. Ihminen on omalla toiminnallaan ajanut itsensä kauas moraalisesti hyväksyttävistä olosuhteista, eikä tämä yksinään ole peruste yllä mainittujen moraaliteoreettisten järjestelmien hylkäämiseen. Sen sijaan arkimoraalin ja moraalisen kielenkäytön on löydettävä keinoja kohdata nämä seuraukset.

Ilkka Pättiniemi, Petri Turunen ja Ilmari Hirvonen

Discourse on Meta-Method: Against Epistemic Anarchism

In his book *Against Method* (1975), Paul Feyerabend famously advocates for epistemic anarchism, insisting that the only method that does not inhibit scientific progress is "anything goes." One line of reasoning that leads to this conclusion is noting the fact that, in practice, science is epistemically opportunistic. That is, any method that works in practice will be employed as needed.

Granting that science indeed employs epistemic opportunism, does this mean that Feyerabend was right in his anarchism? In this paper, we argue that the link between epistemic opportunism and epistemic anarchism is weaker than one might suppose at first glance. To this end, we will discuss a stance we call anti-arbitrarism, which, we argue, constrains scientific methodology and, indeed, all rational epistemic activity. Therefore, if science is indeed epistemically anti-arbitrary, it cannot be fully anarchistic even though it is

opportunistic.

What does one mean when one says that science is epistemically opportunistic? One means that any method that gives correct results, better than random chance, can be employed, and the currently known, more reliable methods are to be applied whenever possible. But this raises the question: how do we determine that a method is useful in this sense? A very minimal demand for comparing any putative methods is that they give some results which one can then compare. That is, the results cannot be totally arbitrary. Furthermore, it is not enough to just have some non-arbitrary results if they cannot be compared also in practice. This means that the used results must also be intersubjectively evaluable. Following epistemic opportunism thus entails certain anti-arbitrariness constraints.

If this much is granted, then the idea that there is no singular method of science can no longer lead to the statement "anything goes" without qualification. Rather, the conclusion one can draw is that "anything that non-arbitrarily works, goes." This, we argue, is an important distinction, as (pure) epistemic anarchism no longer follows from the lack of a singular method. However, this also raises the question of what conditions need to be fulfilled so that one can justifiably claim that something is non-arbitrarily intersubjectively evaluable. We argue that there are at least four criteria that must be met: explicitness, contrastiveness, epistemic accessibility, and conditionality.

Explicitness means that the criteria for evaluating theories must be explicated. In other words, they have to be made public through some means of presentation. Contrastiveness states that there must be a difference between whether or not a theory correctly describes its intended target. Epistemic accessibility, in turn, means that there must be intersubjective access to this difference. So, it must be possible to check or at least evaluate (i.e., give unequivocal reasons for) whether a theory is correct or not. And finally, according to conditionality, every conclusion is only conditionally justified with respect to its initial assumptions or, in other words, the invoked reasons and justification relations. We flesh out these four conditions in more detail as a set of theses.

Lack of a single method does not need to lead to epistemic anarchism, since one can have a single metamethod. Thus epistemic opportunism does not lead to anarchism.

Panu Raatikainen

Chalmers's Two-Dimensionalism and Reference

David Chalmers's famous two-dimensional argument against materialism (Chalmers 1996, 2023, 2009) presupposes "Modal Monism," i.e., that in analyzing both metaphysical necessity and apriority in the possible worlds framework, we can do with a single space of possible worlds. Chalmers suggests that a sentence *S* can be true at a single possible world *W* in two different ways: *W* considered as actual ("*W* verifies *S*") and *W* considered as counterfactual ("*W* satisfies *S*"). Chalmers contends that this two-dimensional framework will provide a unified analysis of the Kripkean necessary a posteriori (and contingent a priori). Another important application for Chalmers is related to theories of meaning. He aims to vindicate a broadly Fregean theory of meaning with the help of his two-dimensional framework.

Chalmers gives in his two-dimensionalist project a central place for the following philosophical thesis:

The Core Thesis. For any sentence token *S*, *S* is a priori if and only if all possible worlds verify *S*.

Chalmers says recurrently that this is the "crucial" and "distinctive" claim of his epistemic two-dimensionalism. The central target of Chalmers's philosophical program is to provide an

interpretation of the general two-dimensional approach which would satisfy the Core Thesis (see, e.g., Chalmers 2006).

Chalmers distinguishes two quite different ways of interpreting the general two-dimensional framework: "the contextual understanding," where the "possible worlds" of the first dimension are contexts of utterance, and "the epistemic understanding," in which "a possible world" is any scenario not ruled out a priori. For Chalmers's own philosophical aspirations, the latter becomes vital. That is, the contextual interpretation results—for his objectives—problems with sentences such as "Language exists." Namely, sentences like this seem to be true in all contexts in which they are uttered. However, Chalmers grants that such sentences are knowable only a posteriori, and therefore there should exist possible worlds which would verify their negations (see, e.g., Chalmers 2006). Let us call such possible worlds which lack languages and analogous conceptual thoughts "empty worlds."

Kripke (1972, 1980) famously attacked "the description theory of reference"—in short, "descriptivism." Critics have sometimes accused Chalmers of grounding his two-dimensionalist framework essentially in descriptivism. However, Chalmers has repeatedly insisted that he is not presupposing descriptivism. Indeed, Chalmers even says he thinks that such descriptivist theses are "probably false." Kripke also put forward an alternative to descriptivism, "the historical chain picture of reference." The picture splits into two parts: there is the initial introduction of a referring expression, and the subsequent transmission of the expression, or "reference borrowing." Chalmers does not repudiate the Kripkean picture but contends that his two-dimensionalist framework is compatible with it. He aims instead to accommodate Kripke's celebrated observations into his framework. In the talk, I critically examine how more exactly this is supposed to work. I argue that Chalmers's account ends up with considerable difficulties.

Perhaps most seriously: Let us focus on "reference-borrowing" and borrowed expression tokens, such as (Kripke's famous examples) "Gödel" or "Feynman" for a more ignorant language user, and "empty worlds" (which are important for Chalmers's specific epistemic interpretation of the two-dimensional framework). Chalmers's account entails that all such expression tokens fail to refer to anything in all possible worlds which are "empty," and sentence tokens with them lack truth-value. I argue that this is much more problematic than Chalmers seems to recognize. In fact, it undermines his fundamental "Core Thesis." As a result, Chalmers's whole philosophical project is driven into inconsistencies.

Milla Rantala

Yhdessä muuttuminen: Kahden aikuisen intiimin rakkaussuhteen dynamiikka

Mikä merkitys yhdessä muuttumisella (mutual transformation) on kahden aikuisen intiimissä rakkaussuhteessa? Tutkin yhdessä muuttumista dynamiikkana, joka kannattelee rakkaussuhteeseen sitoutuneiden yksilöiden erillisiä toimijuuden, merkityksellisyyden ja vapauden kokemuksia. Analysoin näiden kokemusten kannalta affirmatiivisen yhdessä muuttumisen dynamiikan rakennepiirteitä ex negativo aloittaen haitallisten parisuhdedynamiikkojen piirteistä. Negatiivisina esimerkkeinä käytän psykologista traumasidoksen (traumatic bonding) ilmiötä sekä otteita Märta Tikkasen kaunokirjallisesta teoksesta Vuosisadan rakkaustarina (2018 [1978]). Sovellan siis filosofian menetelmää, jota esimerkiksi Michael Theunissen on kutsunut metodologiseksi negativismiksi. Negativistinen menetelmä tarkoittaa jonkin affirmatiivisen idean johtamista jostakin tälle vastakkaisesta ideasta tai ilmiöstä. Tällaista negativistista menetelmää käytetään myös fenomenologisessa psykopatologiassa. Klassista fenomenologista filosofiaa hyödyntävän fenomenologisen psykopatologian tutkimuskohteena voi olla itse psykopatologisten ilmiöiden lisäksi se, miten nämä ilmiöt voivat valottaa inhimillisen kokemuksen yleisiä rakennepiirteitä negatiivisen kontrastin avulla. Fenomenologisen psykopatologian uranuurtajana pidetty Maurice Merleau-Ponty hyödynsi negatiivista kontrastia selvittäessään optimaalisen eletyn kokemuksen

rakennepiirteitä teoksessaan *Phénoménologie de la perception* (1945).

Tutkimukseni kiinnittyy eksistentiaalisen fenomenologian perinteeseen ja sivuaa fenomenologista psykopatologiaa edellä mainitussa menetelmällisessä mielessä. Hyödynnän ennen kaikkea Maurice Merleau-Pontyn ja Simone de Beauvoirin filosofisia jäsennyksiä ihmisen eksistenssistä ja kahden aikuisen rakkaussuhteesta. Yhdessä muuttumisen ideaan liittyen viittaan myös fenomenologiseen ja enaktivistiseen nykytutkimukseen. Sekä yhdessä muuttumisen käsitteen teoreettiset että normatiiviset ulottuvuudet ovat vielä pitkälti selvittämättä. Käsite on esiintynyt fenomenologisessa nykykirjallisuudessa, mutta sitä ei ole vielä riittävästi tutkittu. Enaktivistisessa tutkimuksessa on hahmoteltu yhdessä muuttumista tietoteoreettisena ja eettisenä käsitteenä. Erotuksena tietoteoreettisesta ja enaktivistisesta lähtökohdasta tässä hahmottelemani yhdessä muuttumisen käsite kytkeytyy fenomenologiseen intersubjektiiivisuuden teoriaan ja relationaaliseen etiikkaan. Kahden aikuisen rakkaussuhteessa yhdessä muuttuminen näyttää toimijuuteen ja siihen liittyviin epäoikeudenmukaisuuden muotoihin keskittyvää lähestymistapaa laajempaan vuorovaikutusdynamiikkana. Yhdessä muuttuminen intiimin rakkaussuhteen dynamiikkana mahdollistaa ja pitää sisällään myös tiedolliset toimijuuden ja merkityksellisyyden kokemukset, muttei rajoitu näihin. Yhdessä muuttumisen dynamiikka kannattelee eli affirmoi paitsi rakastajien tietoisia ja reflektiivisiä myös esitietoisia ja esireflektiivisiä kokemuksia toimijuudesta, merkityksellisyydestä ja vapaudesta.

Kahden aikuisen intiimi rakkaussuhde on eksistentiaalinen ja ruumiidenvälinen tilanne, jolloin rakastajien sitoutuminen toisiinsa tapahtuu useissa eri inhimillisen olemisen ulottuvuuksissa. Intiimi rakkaussuhde on siis ainakin ruumiillinen, persoonallinen ja seksuaalinen sidos jaetussa eksistentiaalisessa tilanteessa ja näin ollen erityisen altis vallan ja väkivallan ilmentymille. Onkin tärkeää ajatella, että rakastajat elävät tässä suhteessa lomittain mutta silti erillisinä oman transsendenssinsa ja vapautensa säilyttävinä yksilöinä. Ihmisyksilöt ovat paitsi älyllisiä ja tiedollisia myös ainakin ruumiillisia, seksuaalisia ja emotionaalisia toimijoita ja rakkaussuhde toisen ihmisen kanssa eletään moniselitteisesti näiden eksistentiaalisten ulottuvuuksien risteyskohdissa. On ajateltava, ettei kahden aikuisen rakkaussuhteen dynamiikka ole riippumattomien toimijoiden aikaansaannos tai valinta vaan suhteeseen sitoutuneiden rakastajien monitahoinen eletty tilanne, joka pakenee yksiselitteisiä tulkintoja.

Intiimin rakkaussuhteen yksilöiden tahdosta ja päätöksistä riippumaton dynaaminen rakenne ei ehkä tule näkyviin tai nouse pohdinnan kohteeksi silloin kun kaikki niin sanotusti menee suhteessa hyvin tai pysyy normaalin rajoissa. Kuten fenomenologisen psykopatologian perinteessä on huomattu, erilaiset patologiat ja yksilön kannalta haitalliset tilanteet sen sijaan saavat aikaan tarpeen selvittää näiden syitä ja seurauksia ja tällöin nousee esiin myös mahdollisuus tarkastella kriittisesti yleisinä tai normaaleina pitämiämme inhimillisen kokemuksen rakenteita. Patologinen tilanne voi toimia ikään kuin fenomenologisen reduktion katalyyttina ja saada meidät näkemään arkisten sitoumustemme ja uskomustemme alkuperäisen satunnaisuuden. Tämä mahdollistaa sekä haitallisen ja optimaalisen että patologisen ja normaalin eletyn kokemuksen variaation ja rajanvedon.

Esitän, että yhdessä muuttumisen dynamiikka kannattelee toisiinsa sitoutuneiden rakastajien erillisiä toimijuuden, merkityksellisyyden ja eksistentiaalisen vapauden kokemuksia. Yhdessä muuttumisen dynamiikka mahdollistaa toisiinsa sitoutuneiden rakastajien pysymisen erillisinä toimijoina ihmisenä olemisen eri alueilla. Lisäksi yhdessä muuttumisen dynamiikka mahdollistaa sekä rakastajien että itse suhteen muuttumisen ajan kuluessa ja elämäntilanteiden vaihtuessa. Kahden aikuisen rakkaussuhteessa yhdessä muuttuminen ei rajaudu esimerkiksi episteemiseen vaihtoon tai kielelliseen kommunikaatioon vaan on näitä enemmän tutkittuja yhdessä muuttumisen muotoja laajempi inhimillisen vuorovaikutuksen dynamiikka, joka affirmoi suhteessa elävien yksilöiden toimijuuden, merkityksellisyyden ja

eksistentiaalisen vapauden kokemuksia. Yhdessä muuttuminen on kahden aikuisen rakkaussuhteen optimaalinen dynamiikka, koska se kykenee kannattelemaan rakastajia esimerkiksi älyllisesti, seksuaalisesti, emotionaalisesti ja tiedollisesti erillisinä toimijoina yhteisessä elämäntilanteessa.

Jaakko Reinikainen

Normativity of meaning: What was the question?

Ever since Saul Kripke's influential reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later works in 1982, a debate has sprawled over the so-called 'normativity of meaning' thesis. In its most general form, the idea is that there is an important, even essential connection between the pre-theoretical notions of meaning and normativity. What that connection exactly amounts to is one of the main points of contention, with no clear winner in sight.

This paper provides an opinionated review of the most recent developments in the normativity of meaning debate. The goal of the review part is to show that essentially two camps have emerged over the interpretation of the 'normativity problem' in Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein. I call these 'the correctness narrative' and 'the justification narrative', respectively.

Briefly, the main idea of the correctness narrative is the claim, taken as a platitude, that meaningful expressions come with inherent correctness conditions that specify under which conditions the use of the expression is semantically correct, when incorrect. The debate then essentially comes down to whether 'semantic correctness' is a normative notion, either in the sense that norms underlie the correctness conditions of meaningful expressions, or then that correctness conditions entail normative consequences. 'Normative consequences' can be given a few interpretations, yet the dominant alternatives are that either the meaning of an expression guides its use by giving good reasons to use it in a certain way and not others, or then there is some prescriptive or proscriptive entailment concerning the use of the expression. 'Anti-normativists' answer that there is no interesting, important connection between normativity and meaning in these senses, while 'normativists' answer that there is.

In contrast, the justification narrative understands the normativity problem essentially as the sceptical challenge to justify meaning ascriptions of the rough form 'S means x by "y"'. In particular, the challenge is to show some kind of a fact, an appeal to which could, at least in principle, justify the truth of the meaning ascription, taken as a description with truth conditions. So, the difference to the correctness narrative is to question the alleged platitude from which the correctness narrative begins, namely that meaningful expressions have correctness conditions to begin with.

The opinionated part of the paper has two goals. First is to argue that the correctness narrative, insofar as it is intended as an exegetical reading of Kripke's book, is wrong. The sceptical challenge does not have the argumentative shape of the correctness narrative. The second opinionated goal is to argue that the normativist line within the correctness narrative is wrong, since despite the richness of various normativist proposals, it will be shown that they all either end up in a deflated, uninteresting notions of semantic normativity or they then come into agreement with the anti-normativist stance. So, beyond exegetical concerns, meaning is not normative in the sense in which the correctness narrative understands it to be

Pauliina Remes

The Conflicting Norms of Inquiry: The Case of Plato

Epistemology has for some time been in the business of broadening its scope. According to virtue epistemologists, we should look at the ways in which knowledge is acquired, and the

normative features involved. According to zetetic epistemologists, we ought to consider what happens in inquiries, especially as they have a particular ontology: they are processes, the parts of which call for distinctive normative regulations. Interestingly, Platonic dialogues cover many procedural phases from wonder and ignorance to question formulation, presentation of alternative views and methods, all the way to concept-sharpening, ruling out unpromising directions, sometimes suggesting tentative positive views. When Socrates poses requirements on the length of the conversational inputs, or when he calls for the participants to present their own views and not those of someone else, or when he, say, demands transparency on who leads the discussion and which views have been changed during the conversation, Plato is testing norms that could ideally promote inquiries.

I will call norms of (conversational) inquiries collectively all the recommendations, sometimes introduced as virtues, at other times imperatives on what to do next in the sunousia and zetesis that comprises a given dialogue. Often, the norms are expressed by Socrates but not exclusively so. The way Socrates uses them is to turn and regulate a conversation towards a particular kind of activity, one that is a philosophical inquiry. I take it that it is undeniable that such exhortations – oughts – are often expressed, in particular when something in the inquiry at hand frustrates or is in need of revision.

Inquiries have their own normative space, and these norms, so I suggest, ideally their own logical structure. Yet we see in the dialogues how sometimes the discussants, in particular the Sophists and Socrates, covertly or overtly disagree over norms. A disagreement about a norm of conversational inquiry arises when 2 or more different participants disagree on which norm should be orienting the conversation. I will argue that these disagreements often result from the participants' actual disagreement of what the goal of the shared activity is, and are, hence, disagreements of the proper normative domain. A conflict of norms arises when one participant (or several participants collectively) – here Socrates – seems to assent to 2 norms that are either directly or indirectly inconsistent. The paper will study a couple of such conflicts, and assess what repercussions they have for an aspiration for a systematic normative architecture of inquiries in Plato.

A possible counter argument for this kind of interpretation is the following: If the norms introduced are often contextual, and, moreover, if we, as we surely must, take it that Plato is trying out different possibilities to shift the norms one ought to follow in a conversation or at best laying out tentative rules, then perhaps to look for a conflict is a non-starter. To this I will reply: it is certainly the case that we should not push the idea of systematicity too far, and must take into account the contextual nature of Platonic methodology. Yet conflicts and inconsistencies act, both generally and by Socrates' own lights, as indicators of deeper philosophical convictions, different possible positions and their logical relations. In the case of the epistemology of Socratic-Platonic inquiries, conflicting norms may guide as to what Plato saw as both interesting and problematic in so-called Socratic methodology, it may allow us to place at least some of the norms suggested into some kind of hierarchy of importance, and to consider what the effects of a certain norm are, whether they suit to every situation, and whether there is any systematicity to be found in putting them into use.

For the purposes of this paper, we will be looking at examples from the dialogues Protagoras and Gorgias.

Erika Ruonakoski

Maailma uudessa valossa: eksistentiaalinen kääntymys vs. salaliittoteoreetikoiden "herääminen"

Esitystäni innoittaa Bruno Latourin (2004) väite, jonka mukaan populaarin yhteiskuntatieteen asenne vertautuu tietyllä tapaa salaliittoteoreetikkojen asenteeseen: molemmat kohdistavat epäilyksensä lähes kaikkeen mahdolliseen, ja molempien asennetta on mahdollista luonnehtia jossakin määrin paranoidiksi. Toisaalta filosofia itsessään on tunnettu siitä, että se on luonteeltaan perustavalla tavalla kysymistä ja kyseenalaistamista. Tässä esitelmässä vertailen filosofista ja salaliittoteoreettista asennetta, kuitenkin niin, että filosofian osalta päähuomioni on kuitenkin eksistentiaalisissa, jonka käsitän eksistenssifilosofian perinteeseen sijoittuvaksi ajatussuuntaukseksi sekä filosofiseksi elämänasenteeksi, jonka harjoittajan ei välttämättä tarvitse olla filosofi. Tarkempi kysymykseni on: mitkä ovat salaliittoteoreettisen ja eksistentiaalisen ajattelun erot ja yhtäläisyydet ja miten niiden kautta hahmottuu uudenlaisen tiedollis-eettisen asenteen omaksuminen?

Teoreettisena lähtökohtanani on erityisesti Simone de Beauvoirin eksistentiaalinen filosofia ja hänen muotoilemansa ajatus eksistentiaalisesta kääntymyksestä, mutta käsitelen myös Søren Kierkegaardin ja Martin Heideggerin "hetken" (Augenblick, øjeblik) käsitettä, joka kuvaa perustavaan asennemuutokseen johtavaa tilannetta. Salaliittoteoreetikoiden asenteita valotan viimeaikaisten filosofisten ja empiiristen tutkimusten avulla.

Monenlaisia yhtymäkohtia löytyy eksistentiaalismin ja salaliittoteoreettisen ajattelun väliltä ainakin pintatasolla. Huomiota herättää ensinnäkin se, että molemmat pyrkivät kyseenalaistamaan perinteiset auktoriteetit ja tavoittelevat autenttisuutta. Keskeisimmäksi nousee kuitenkin kysymys siitä, millä tavalla salaliittoteoreetikoiden läpikäymä "herääminen" muistuttaa eksistentiaalisesta kääntymystä.

Beauvoirin filosofiassa eksistentiaalinen kääntymys vaikuttaa jossain määrin intellektuaaliselta toimenpiteeltä, sillä hän kuvailee sitä eräänlaiseksi epokhéksi, sulkeistamiseksi, joka kohdistuu ihmisen tahtoon määrittää itsensä tietynlaiseksi (tahtoon olla) ja kieltää transsendenssin ulottuvuus itsessään. Toisaalta Kierkegaardin ja Heideggerin ajattelussa keskeisessä asemassa on hetki, jona muutos tapahtuu. Kierkegaardin "silmänräpäys" eli "hetki" toistaa eksistentiaalisella tasolla Korinttilaiskirjeissä kuvatun hetken, jona Jumala tulee lihaksi. Heidegger puolestaan toteaa, että "pieni tai suuri tapahtuma" johtaa täälläolon kohtaamaan oman äärellisyytensä ja sitä myötä ennakoimaan kuolemaa omana mahdollisuutenaan. Näin ollen eksistenssifilosofia ei tarjoa vain yhtä vaan useita kuvauksia kääntymyksestä, joka johtaa kohti autenttisuutta.

Jotkut salaliittoteoreetikot puolestaan kuvaavat heräämistään sekä sosiaalisesti että henkiseksi (Solman 2023). Herääminen ei välttämättä tapahdu hetkessä vaan pidemmän ajan kuluessa. Pyrkimyksenä on puhdistautua ulkoisesta ohjailusta, jolloin henkilön tulee "tehdä omaa tutkimustaan" ja seurata "omaa opastustaan". Salaliittoteoreetikon kohdalla tämä tie johtaa kohti autenttisuutta.

Eroavaisuuksia kuitenkin löytyy näiden kahden eri ajatusmuodon tavasta nähdä autenttisuus, suhde itseen ja toiseen, kriittisen ajattelun luonne, luotettavan tiedon kriteerit sekä tiedollinen ja eettinen vastuu. Siinä missä salaliittoteoreetikko hylkää valtavirtatieteen, koska olettaa sen harjoittajien taloudellisten sidosten vääristävän heidän tarjoamaansa tietoa, eksistentiaalisti kieltäytyy ottamasta mitään arvoja itsestäänselvyyksinä vain siksi, että ne ovat yleisiä: ihmisen on valittava omat arvonsa ja kannettava vastuu niiden pohjalta tehdyistä ratkaisuksista. Näin ollen kyseenalaistamisen kohde on eri, mikä ei toki tarkoita, että eksistentiaalisti ottaisi tieteen "totuudet" annettuina, kytkeytyväthän nekin vallitseviin arvoihin. Eksistentiaalisti ei

oleta puhdasta, arvovapaata tietoa olemassaolevaksi, tuotetaanhan kaikki tutkimustieto tuotetaan aina jossakin historiallisessa ja sosiaalisessa kontekstissa; salaliittoteoreetikko sen sijaan etsii juuri puhdasta, vääristymätöntä tietoa.

Missä määrin jos lainkaan salaliittoteoretisoinnista ja eksistentialismista on sitten löydettävissä paranoidi asenne? Salaliittoteoretikon asenne on sikäli paranoidi, että epäilyn ensisijainen kohde ja vastuussa oleva taho on aina joku muu, usein mielikuvituksellisen juonikas mutta epämääräinen taho, esimerkiksi varjovaltio (Deep State), Big Pharma tai Illuminati. Eksistentialistille keskeisiä kysymyksiä sen sijaan eivät ole "ketkä tahtovat minulle tai meille pahaa" ja "huijataanko meitä". Sen sijaan hän tutkii omien uskomustensa ja toimintansa oikeutusta. Toisaalta esimerkiksi Beauvoir omaksuu ajattelunsa marxilaisen mystifikaation käsitteen, joka viittaa sosioekonomisen dynamiikan hämärtämiseen ja sen näyttäytymiseen ikään kuin luonnonlakina. Toisin sanoen jonkinlainen ajatus huijatuksi tulemisesta on löydettävissä eksistentialismin alistussuhteita koskevista analyyseistä.

Pinnalliset yhteneväisyydet eksistentialistisen filosofian ja salaliittoteoreetikkojen asenteiden välillä ei tietenkään tarkoita, että eksistentialismi ajatussuuntauksena olisi ongelmallinen. Vertailuni tarkoituksena ei ole demonisoida mitään ajattelutapaa vaan selvittää, minkälaisen jaettujen kokemusmuotojen päälle eri ajatussuuntaukset rakentavat teesinsä. Esitän, että johonkin uuteen herääminen tai sen oivaltaminen saattaa olla kokemuksena varsin samankaltainen riippumatta siitä, minkä ajattelutavan osaksi tämä kokemus valjastetaan. Henkilökohtaisella tasolla tällaisella käänteellä voi olla yksilölle valtaisa merkitys – koko hänen tapansa ymmärtää omaa toimintaansa ja tehdä ratkaisuja voi muuttua. Vaikka voimmekin kenties osoittaa, että salaliittoteoretikon kyky arvioida tiedon luotettavuutta on puutteellinen, voi olla vaikeaa tai mahdotonta kumota hänen kokemukseensa heräämisestä ja "todellisemman" todellisuuden löytymisestä.

Jenni Rytälä

The role of social objectivity in mathematics

Social objectivity has been recognized by many philosophers of science as an important constituent of objectivity in empirical sciences. But what role does it play in mathematical objectivity?

My starting point is that while mathematics is highly objective, this objectivity is not a matter of accurately describing an independently existing mathematical reality. Since mathematics is done by real fallible people embedded in specific social contexts, a realistic account of mathematical objectivity needs to pay attention to the social processes of knowledge production in actual mathematical practice. In this talk, I use conceptions of social objectivity discussed by feminist philosophers of science to examine the roles that social practices and processes have in constituting mathematical objectivity. I look at three forms of social objectivity (Douglas 2004) and examine how they function in mathematics.

The first form is procedural objectivity, which means that social processes can be considered objective if the same outcome is always produced, regardless of who is performing the process. This form is involved in mathematics in a particularly strong form, since mathematics has very clear and explicit processes of knowledge production, namely proofs. Following valid proof methods produces the same results no matter who constructs the proof, and this is what makes mathematical results remarkably reliable and permanent. The central role of proofs raises two questions that point to other forms of social objectivity also playing a role: (1) How do we recognize that a proof correctly follows the legitimate methods? (2) How are particular

proof methods accepted as valid?

The second form, concordant objectivity, requires that everyone in the scientific community agrees on the results. This plays out in two ways in mathematics: First, a proof is considered valid only when it has been checked and accepted by other mathematicians. Having multiple checkers testify that the proof is correct makes the result more reliable, because there is less chance that the proof contains substantial errors (Andersen et al 2020). Second, we must agree on the criteria for what counts as a valid proof. The validity of proof methods is not universal but depends on the goals and underlying assumptions of a particular practice, and mathematical communities have considerable freedom to choose which goals and assumptions to accept. There is wide variety of different legitimate methodologies (e.g. different axiomatizations, classical vs constructive proof methods), and different fields have different standards even for evaluating the same proof (Ingis et al 2013). Consequently, concordant objectivity in mathematics is relative to a specific field and community, which further highlights the social nature of this form of objectivity.

What then ensures that the agreements of a particular mathematical community are legitimate? Interactive objectivity becomes relevant here, since it concerns the conditions of social interaction which increase the reliability of a process of inquiry. According to Longino (1990), these include recognized avenues for criticism, shared standards for arguments, responsiveness to criticism, and equal distribution of intellectual authority. For mathematical results to be objective in this sense, proofs should be shareable (de Toffoli 2021) and subject to a functioning review-process where the trust in the reviewer's testimony of the correctness of the proof is fairly distributed. But this is not always the case: reviewers are not universally expected to check the correctness of all claims in papers (Geist et al 2010) and the author's reputation can guard against challenges, preventing mistakes to be found. Furthermore, judgements of what results count as original and interesting, and not just correct, are crucial for the development of mathematics. Unequal distribution of the power to make these judgements or unjust barriers to access the required (sometimes secret) background knowledge (Rittberg et al 2018) can put into question whether the produced knowledge is objective or in some way biased.

I conclude with a discussion on how social forms of objectivity relate to other aspects of mathematical objectivity. There are various non-social constraints that ensure that the choices and agreements of mathematical communities are not arbitrary. These include basic evolutionary cognitive abilities (e.g. dealing with numerosities), applicability to empirical phenomena, systematic links between different mathematical theories, and broad logical constraints (e.g. using consistent and explicit reasoning, goal of non-contradiction). But note that mathematicians can choose to modify or disregard some constraints to suite their goals. For instance, pure mathematics is completely detached from empirical applications, and even contradictions are tolerated in paraconsistent mathematics. Thus, social objectivity is involved also in determining the appropriate set of constraints to follow. But whatever the relevant constraints are in each case, they explain why mathematical results seem to force themselves upon us.

In sum, paying close attention to social forms of objectivity explains how and why, to quote Ferreirós (2016, 257), "the legendary objectivity of mathematics is, more than anything, a strongly constrained form of intersubjectivity".

References:

Andersen, Line Edslev; Andersen, Hanne & Sørensen, Henrik Kragh (2020). The role of testimony in mathematics. *Synthese* 199 (1-2):859-870.

De Toffoli, Silvia (2021). Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics. *Philosophical*

Quarterly 7 (4):823-844.

Douglas, Heather (2004). The Irreducible Complexity of Objectivity. *Synthese* 138 (3):453 - 473.

Ferreirós, José (2016) *Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices*. Princeton University Press.

Geist, C., Löwe, B., & Kerkhove, B. V. (2010). Peer review and knowledge by testimony in mathematics. In Benedikt Löwe, Thomas Müller (eds.), *Philosophy of Mathematics: Sociological Aspects and Mathematical Practice*. College Publications, London.

Inglis, M., Mejia-Ramos, J. P., Weber, K., & Alcock, L. (2013). On mathematicians' different standards when evaluating elementary proofs. *Topics in cognitive science*, 5(2), 270-282.

Longino, Helen E. (1990). *Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry*. Princeton University Press.

Rittberg, Colin Jakob; Tanswell, Fenner Stanley & Van Bendegem, Jean Paul (2020). Epistemic injustice in mathematics. *Synthese* 197 (9):3875-3904.

Lassi Saario-Ramsay

The Two Schools of Formal Consequence in the 14th Century: Redrawing the Distinction

The medieval concept of 'formal consequence' (*consequentia formalis*) is one of the most remarkable precedents of our modern concept of logical consequence. In recent literature, it is commonplace to distinguish between two traditions or 'schools' of formal consequence in the 14th century with different criteria of formality (see e.g. Read, 2012; Klima, 2016; Dutilh Novaes, 2020). According to the substitutional criterion of the so-called Parisian tradition, a consequence is formal if it holds for all uniform substitutions of categorematic terms (roughly analogous to our non-logical terms). According to the containment criterion of the so-called British tradition, a formal consequence is such that the signification or 'understanding' (*intellectus*) of the antecedent contains that of the consequent. For instance,

(A) 'Socrates is a human being; therefore, Socrates is an animal'

is formal by the containment criterion, as Socrates being an animal is included in his being human, but not by the substitutional criterion, because substituting, e.g., 'donkey' for 'animal' produces an invalid consequence. Conversely,

(B) 'Socrates is running and is not running; therefore, a stick is standing in the corner'

is trivially formal by the substitutional criterion, as the antecedent is contradictory for any substitution of categorematic terms, but not formal by the containment criterion, as the understanding of the antecedent does not contain that of the consequent.

The Parisian definition of formal consequence by the substitutional criterion bears a striking resemblance to our standard model-theoretic definition of logical consequence, whereas the British definition in terms of containment seems more akin to the modern notion of analyticity, which almost died out in the 20th century. It is therefore surprising to learn that, as far as we know, it was the British definition that was more popular at the time. Some have summed up the situation by saying that the substitutional criterion was not widely accepted in the 14th century and that most authors embraced the containment criterion instead (Dutilh Novaes, 2008, p. 476; Aho and Yrjönsuuri, 2009, p. 65; see also Klima, 2016, p. 332). It has even been claimed that the substitutional criterion were explicitly criticized in favour of the containment criterion (Aho, 2011, p. 232). My aim in this talk is to find out whether these generalizations stand closer scrutiny and, if they do, to explain why the substitutional criterion was not widely accepted: who were its critics and what were their arguments?

I am looking for answers in a selection of edited texts from several 14th-century authors, most of whom are conventionally classified in the British tradition. I have selected texts that either explicitly contrast the two traditions or implicitly draw from both. Based on these texts, I will argue that the two criteria are more intertwined than it first seems. I will identify several ways in which they were mixed, all of which involve a sort of substitution. The fundamental disagreement, I suggest, is not about substitution as such but about what is to be substituted and what is not, i.e., what counts as form. Rather than simply associating substitution with the Parisian tradition and containment with the British tradition, I would say that both traditions made use of a substitutional criterion: the Parisian tradition applied it with structural form and the British tradition with conceptual form (cf. Strobino, 2017, p. 184ff.).

First, I show how the two criteria and their related notions of form start to emerge in early discussions of formal consequence. I then analyse three different cases of mixing the two: (i) a substitutional criterion with conceptual form as a necessary condition of containment in Nicholas Drukken of Denmark and Ralph Strode, (ii) a substitutional criterion as a 'subcriterion' of containment in Richard Lavenham and of 'formal incompatibility' in William Heytesbury, and (iii) a substitutional criterion with conceptual form as the 'official' criterion of formal consequence in William of Ockham and Peter of Mantua. Observations of such 'mixers' of Parisian and British features have been hitherto scarce and scattered in the secondary literature—except for Paul of Venice, whose sophisticated synthesis at the close of the 14th century has been widely noted by contemporary commentators. I hope to string the bits and pieces together to an overall account, showing that the synthesizing by no means began with Paul but was rather the natural result of gradual developments that go back many decades.

Jani Sinokki

Westermarckian Account of Hate

In this presentation, I explore Edward Westermarck's (1862–1939) account of moral emotions in order to offer new solutions to some prevailing problems for philosophical theories of hate.

Recent philosophical views of hate disagree on how to categorize it. Some authors view hate as foremost an emotion (Landweer 2020; Szanto 2020). It is commonplace to distinguish emotions, episodic felt states with a negative or positive valence, from more persistent dispositions to experience certain emotions in certain circumstances, called sentiments (Shand 1896). A sentiment in this sense, which deviates from the everyday meaning of the word, is a complex mental disposition, which by itself cannot be felt, but can "give birth to the whole gamut of the emotions" (Stout 1903, 223). Accordingly, many view hate as a sentiment (Vendrell Ferran 2021; Deonna and Teroni 2012). Some argue hate can be both (Halperin 2008; see also Salice 2021). Still others view hate as an attitude towards others (Brudholm 2010).

Most authors defending one of the previous views at least agree that hate is an intentional state which presents its targets as hate-worthy. However, this view is not without its difficulties. Most emotional states, like fear or anger, are intentional in that they have definite formal-objects (Kenny 1975). Fear is a response to a threat or danger, anger is a reaction to an offense (Deonna and Teroni 2012; Helm 2020). But saying that hate is a similar response to the hate-worthiness of the target is clearly circular in a bad way.

The possible hate-worthy qualities in the target are many and range from the disgusting to moral corruption. What is more such qualities are more figments of imagination than actual features in the objects. (Consider the famous genocide-justifying stereotypes of people as vermin, cockroaches, or as forming a threat to an in-group.) Explaining properly what is the formal object of hate and how it comes about, then, is a demand any philosophical account of hate must meet.

As authors at least since Sartre (Sartre 1946) have noted, the hate-worthiness of hated targets has a definite moral dimension. Hatred towards a person contains at least implicitly a justification for harming or even destroying the target. Hate can ground violence and aggression precisely because the hater experiences her hostile attitude towards the hated ones as justified, even if it entails their serious mistreatment or destruction. Through this justification, hate is capable of turning off ordinary restraints that guide us to refrain from aggression and violence toward others.

I will argue that Westermarck's view of emergence of normative attitudes, based on our basic emotions and cognitions and our tendency to objectivize those emotions and cognitions as if they were objectively existing in the objects causing our emotions, is of much-needed help in understanding the above issues.

I argue that the elements at play in Westermarck's account of the objectification of moral emotions (Westermarck 1906; 1932; 1939) explains the interplay between emotions, cognitions, and normative attitudes in the right way. These can explain how and why, in hate, the target of hate comes to be viewed as hate-worthy. A central ingredient here is the mistake in objectification Westermarck correctly analyzes: what is at stake is not a mere projection of our emotions onto objects (pace, e.g., Brandt 1959, 166; see also Stroup 1981), but a more subtle mistake of confusing those emotions with the dispositions in objects to arouse those emotions in us (Westermarck 1906, 5–6).

I will sketch a picture of how certain objective features of the target of hate are confused with the negative emotional and cognitive responses in the subject of hate, and how the objectification in this produces the mental state that presents that target to the subject as deserving of the hostility. At the heart of this process is the way in which our normative attitudes stem from and interact with our emotions. This account does much to explain the peculiar formal object of hate, and why the attributions of hate-worthiness are more often than not unfitting to those targets. Also, this view might offer some insight into the question of how to classify hate.

References:

- Brandt, Richard. 1959. *Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Brudholm, Thomas. 2010. "Hatred as an Attitude." *Philosophical Papers* 39 (3): 289–313.
- Deonna, Julien, and Fabrice Teroni. 2012. *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*. Routledge.
- Halperin, Eran. 2008. "Group-Based Hatred in Intractable Conflict in Israel." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (5): 713–36.
- Helm, Bennett W. 2020. "Affective Intentionality and the Reactive Attitudes." In *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion*, edited by Thomas Szanto and Hilge Landweer, 227–38. Abingdon & New York: Routledge.
- Kenny, Anthony. 1975. *Will, Freedom, and Power*. New York: Blackwell.
- Landweer, Hilge. 2020. "Aggressive Emotions: From Irritation to Hatred, Contempt and Indignation." In *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion*, edited by Thomas Szanto and Hilge Landweer, 441–54. Abingdon & New York: Routledge.
- Salice, Alessandro. 2021. "I Hate You. On Hatred and Its Paradigmatic Forms." *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 20:617–33. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09668-0>.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1946. *Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate*. Schocken.
- Shand, Alexander. 1896. "Character and the Emotions." *Mind, New Series*, 5 (18): 203–26.
- Stout, George. 1903. *The Groundwork of Psychology*. New York: Hinds & Noble.
- Stroup, Timothy. 1981. "In Defense of Westermarck." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 19 (2): 213–34.
- Szanto, Thomas. 2020. "In Hate We Trust: The Collectivization and Habitualization of Hatred." *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 19 (3): 453–80.

- Vendrell Ferran, Ingrid. 2021. "Hate: Toward a Four-Types Model." *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, no. 13 July.
- Westermarck, Edward. 1906. *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*. Freeport: Books for Libraries Press.
- . 1932. *Ethical Relativity*. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd.
- . 1939. *Christianity and Morals*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd.

Ninni Suni

What kind of amistake is misplaced distrust?

What kind of a mistake is misplaced, unfounded, or disproportionate distrust? Is it morally wrong, or is it an epistemic mistake? I argue that distrust has both moral and epistemic underpinnings, but whereas sometimes distrust is clearly morally offending, it's less easy to judge whether it's irrational or epistemically faulty.

Unfounded or disproportionate distrust contributes to many problematic phenomena. Privately, it offends the distrusted and harms personal relationships, as when it reveals demeaning stereotypes (D'Cruz 2019), or a low opinion of you (cf. Basu & Schroeder 2018). Publicly, distrust in authorities plays a key role in socially problematic behavior such as vaccine hesitancy (Kärki 2021). Distrust therefore carries a risk of moral harms (D'Cruz 2019). In addition, distrust also carries an epistemic risk: it tends to bias interpretation, thereby risking fair assessment of evidence and leading to biased beliefs and attitudes (Jones 2013).

However, although the risks of mistaken distrust are clear, the moral and epistemic roots of distrust have received less attention. Yet this question is important for assessing the fittingness of distrust, and how to respond to misplaced distrust both privately and publicly.

Disproportionate distrust tends to be met with blame or ridicule, which points to an interesting distinction: blame is a characteristic response to moral wrongdoing, but ridicule hints that the mistake is seen as epistemic—the distrustful agent is seen as failing to assess evidence correctly (cf. Kauppinen 2018). Is the mistake then moral or epistemic?

Disproportionate distrust could be conceptualized as generalizing from a non-representative set—say, treating one misstep as exemplifying a flawed character. As such, it seems to be an epistemic mistake—or that's what many think about prejudice (e.g., Arpaly 2003; Fricker 2007, 2016), which shows similar over-generalization and recalcitrance to counterevidence. But recalcitrance to counterevidence does not show that an attitude is irrational when the attitude involves a generalization (Begby 2013), because a generalization can be true even if not all, or even the majority of its instances have the feature that the generalization points to (Leslie 2007, 2008). Moreover, when a generalization involves what Leslie (2007, 2017) calls a striking property, it may be rational to generalize from a single instance rather than wait for more evidence. Thus, generalization and recalcitrance are not necessarily marks of epistemic fault.

The mistake in over-generalization is that it gives a false prediction about which kinds are disposed to carry the relevant property. All humans are disposed to make mistakes and be untrustworthy, but this is uninformative. We need some way to mark out those who are more likely than others to be untrustworthy: a spot where the generalization is inclusive enough to predict instances of untrustworthy behavior and exclusive enough not to overreach (cf. Leslie 2017). But how do we assess which features predict untrustworthiness, given that we may sometimes want to generalize from very few instances of bad behavior? I argue that mistakes

in this assessment can be caused by a variety of background attitudes, and proper responses to distrust should address those background attitudes.

Groups that are seen to carry essential properties, such as minorities, religious groups, etc., tend to be associated with generalizations (Leslie 2017). This allows us to tackle some paradigmatic cases of misplaced distrust: if an agent holds a demeaning stereotype about a social group G, she's also likely to generalize striking properties of individual members to the whole group. Insofar as holding that stereotype is not excused, it may be morally culpable, and subject to moral criticism (Holroyd 2012).

However, this cannot explain distrust in authorities, nor distrust in a close relationship, as neither involves an essentialized social kind. These are more likely to stem from experiences of past injustice (e.g., Navin 2013).

Distrustful behavior can be construed as a tendency to withdraw from a position of vulnerability based on a construal of the distrusted party as malevolent, incompetent, or lacking integrity (D'Cruz 2019). When unfounded, the construal is certainly offending. But it may also be a generalization of a striking property based on feelings of vulnerability, and rational to the extent that it allows the agent to avoid further harm at an acceptable cost. Distrust can also be construed as a form of disengagement in situations where one expects that one's moral complaint won't be taken seriously, precisely the kinds of situations that involve epistemic injustice, gaslighting, or silencing—and in which the distrusted party is almost sure to see the distrust as unfounded.

Teemu Toppinen

Was Moore a Moral Realist?

According to moral realism, moral judgments are beliefs that represent moral properties and facts, and some of these beliefs are true in that they correspond to the facts. G. E. Moore famously defends the view that goodness is a non-natural, indefinable, sui generis property, known through intuition. On his view, some things also really have moral properties: socializing with friends is good, maximizing the good is right, and so on. Moore's view is, then, standardly taken to be the epitome of moral realism – a starkly realist view that has often been ridiculed for its metaphysical extravagance. I offer several reasons for thinking that Moore was not in fact a moral realist.

§1. Moore on the non-descriptive nature of "predicates of value"

Moore is quite clear that moral properties and predicates are, in his view, non-descriptive. Goodness, according to Moore ("The Conception of Intrinsic Value," pp. 296–297), is not an intrinsic property of things, but a very different kind of property that is dependent on the intrinsic properties of things:

"[I]ntrinsic properties seem to describe the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value never do. If you could enumerate all the intrinsic properties a given thing possessed, you would have given a complete description of it, and would not need to mention any predicates of value it possessed [...]."

Moore also says that when ascribing a non-natural property to a thing, we are not describing the thing at all ("A Reply to My Critics," p. 591–592, in the Library of the Living Philosophers volume from 1942). It is tempting to read Moore as proposing a view, according to which moral judgments do not at all represent, in any substantial sense, the ways the world might

be. This would be in contrast with the moral realist view. In these passages Moore seems to come close to the non-cognitivist view, according to which moral judgments are not representational, but rather perform some different, non-representational, perhaps practical or action-guiding function.

§2. Moore's light-weight metaphysics.

Moore and non-cognitivism? This suggestion is likely to evoke incredulous stares. Non-cognitivism is often taken to be an invention of the 1920s and 1930s, and the non-cognitivists of that time opposed Moore in suggesting that what we call moral judgments are not genuine judgments, at all, but rather expressions of sentiments that cannot be either true or false. However, while it is true that Moore is happy to speak about moral properties and moral truths, we should not read too much 'metaphysical weight' into Moore's talk of such things. For the early Moore (e.g., in his 1897 dissertation and *Principia*), properties just are concepts, and facts are identical with truths. This is entirely compatible with the idea that moral judgments are not representational in nature. It is a fact, alright, that torture is wrong, but for Moore, this just amounts to torture being wrong. And even if the concept of wrongness is wholly non-descriptive, we may still apply this concept to torture and accept that torture is wrong – thus accepting also the existence of a moral fact. Facts, in this sense, come cheap. The later Moore (e.g., *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, based on lectures given in 1910–1911) endorses a correspondence theory of truth, but it's not clear that correspondence, in the relevant sense, is metaphysically very demanding. It just amounts to the idea that 'Torture is wrong,' for instance, is true just in case torture is wrong. Given a suitably minimalist and non-cognitivist-friendly conception of truth, a non-cognitivist has no reason to reject this idea.

§3. Moore's reaction to Stevenson's proposal.

Moore did come to consider, in the 1940s, a view that he took to imply that moral judgments are not true or false. Considering C. L. Stevenson's suggestion that moral words (e.g., "wrong") are "not the names of characteristics at all, that they have merely 'emotive meaning'," Moore ("A Reply to My Critics," p. 554) says: "I am inclined to think that this is so, but I am also inclined to think that this is not so; and I do not know which way I am inclined most strongly." This is not a reaction you would expect from someone holding a realist view about ethics. But this is just the kind of response that might be given by someone who is inclined to think that moral judgments are non-representational, but nevertheless truth-apt.

§4. Some further things.

There are many other things that are of interest in this context. First, it is not clear that Moore's most important influences, Sidgwick and Brentano, are best interpreted as having been moral realists. Second, in the rarely discussed fourth chapter of *Principia*, Moore clearly manifests his understanding of a certain kind of non-cognitivist proposal. He does not endorse the proposal in question, but he appreciates its attractions, and it is remarkable that this kind of proposal even is on Moore's radar in 1903. Third, Moore's early characterizations (in 1897) of his views as akin to those of Plato's, and of ethics as being a science rather than an art, are not at all suggestive of a genuinely realist view, once they are understood correctly. Fourth and finally, Moore's classification of the main problems of philosophy (from 1910–1911), in *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, is also striking. Ethics is mentioned only briefly, as giving rise to problems of a very different kind from those of metaphysics or logic. Once again, it turns out that while metaphysics describes the world, ethics does something else entirely: the job of ethics is not to describe, but to evaluate.

§5. Conclusion.

None of this is meant to establish that Moore would have accepted a non-cognitivist view, or even clearly rejected moral realism. But Moore's status as the epitome of a moral realist is worth questioning. There's more work to be done, here, for Moore scholars and the historians of metaethics.

Aku Visala

Rajoittaako masennus tahdonvapautta?

Tahdonvapautta ja moraalista vastuullisuutta käsittelevässä filosofisessa kirjallisuudessa on hyvin tavallista olettaa, että erilaiset mielenterveyden häiriöt joko poistavat ihmisen vapauden tai ainakin rajoittavat sitä siinä määrin, ettei niistä kärsiviä ihmisiä ole sopivaa pitää moraalisesti vastuullisina toimijoina. Vaikuttaa ensikatsomalta selvältä, että mielenterveyden häiriöt rajoittavat ihmisen moraalisen toimijuuden kykyjä. Tarkastelen erityisesti yhtä mielenterveyden häiriötä, masennusta. Masennuksessa ihmisen kognitiivinen, erityisesti päätöksentekoon liittyvä, toiminta vaikeutuu, koska negatiiviset vääristymät ottavat vallan. Lisäksi masentuneen ihmisen toiminnanohjaus ei toimi tavallisella tavalla. Masentunut ihminen esimerkiksi luopuu tavallisesta helpommin vaikeista, tietoista pyrkimystä vaativista tehtävistä. Mielenterveyden häiriöstä kärsivä ei väärin toimiessaan "ole oma itsensä", vaan toimii tavalla, joka ei ole vapaa. Tällä perusteella voitaisiin väittää, että meidän tulisi antaa masennuksesta kärsiville ihmisille vapautus monista moraalisisista normeista ja odotuksista.

Pyrin kuitenkin osoittamaan, että tämä aluksi vakuuttavalta näyttävä järkeily on huonosti perusteltu ja itse asiassa haitallinen mielenterveyden häiriöistä kärsiville ihmisille. Esitän, että masennuksesta kärsivät henkilöt ovat pääsääntöisesti kykeneviä tekemään vapaita valintoja, jonka seurauksena heitä tulisi kohdella moraalisisina toimijoina. Masennus aiheuttaa kuitenkin tiettyjä päätöksentekoon ja toiminnanohjaukseen liittyviä ongelmia, jotka antavat perusteen keventää moitetta tai rangaistusta, jos masentunut ihminen tekee väärin.

Tarkastelen aluksi sitä, millaisia oireita masennusoireyhtymässä on. Kiinnitän huomiota erityisesti kognitiivisiin vääristymiin ja toiminnanohjaukseen. Tämän jälkeen tarkastelen masennusta ja vapautta kahden teorian valossa. Ensiksi tarkastelen masennusta kontrolliteorian valossa. Kontrolliteorian mukaan vapaus voidaan ymmärtää tietoisena tekojen hallintana. Kontrolliteorian mukaan masennus kyllä rajoittaa ihmisen vapautta hallita tekojaan muttei välttämättä siinä määrin, että vastuusta vapauttaminen olisi perusteltua. Tarkastelen masennusta myös attribuutioteorian valossa, jonka mukaan vapaa toiminta ilmentää tai kuvaa toimijan arvostuksia, haluja ja päämääriä. Tämä teoria päättyy tulokseen, että ainakin joiltakin osin masentuneet ihmiset yhä kykenevät ilmaisemaan arvostuksiaan ja päämääriään omassa toiminnassaan.

Lopuksi väitän, että meillä on myös hyviä käytännöllisiä syitä pitää masentuneita ihmisiä vapaina ja vastuussa teoistaan. Kun tunnustamme toimijan vapauden ja vastuun, tunnustamme hänet osaksi moraalista yhteisöämme. Näin myös negatiivisten tunteiden, kuten pettymyksen ja paheksunnan, kohteena oleminen ilmaisee, että kohteena oleva ihminen kuuluu moraaliseen yhteisöömme. Psykiatrian historia osoittaa ikävästi sen, kuinka potilaiden toimijuus on usein systemaattisesti ohitettu ja heidät on dehumanisoitu hoitotoimenpiteiden kohteeksi. Tätä taustaa vasten mielenterveyspotilaiden vapauden kunnioittaminen on ehdottoman tärkeää niin heidän hoitonsa kuin ihmisarvoisen kohtelunsakin kannalta. Hahmottelen tässä yhteydessä sellaista vastuussa pitämisen asennetta, joka kunnioittaa potilaan vapautta mutta samaan aikaan pidättäytyy joistakin vastuussa pitämisen vahvasti emotionaalisista puolista. Tämä ei kuitenkaan tarkoita masennuspotilaan vastuusta vapauttamista, vaan vastuussa pitämiseen liittyviin negatiivisten tunteiden säätelyä

Fredrik Westerlund

Skam, identitet och frågan om autenticitet

I det här föredraget vill jag undersöka två frågor: 1. Vilken roll spelar identitet i skam? 2. Hur förhåller sig det slags identiteter som är kopplade till skam till frågor om autenticitet?

Frågan om skam och identitet har främst diskuterats bland filosofer och andra forskare som inte ser skam som en social känsla, utan som en autonom självutvärdering som inte alls behöver hänvisa till andra människor (jfr Rawls 1971; Taylor 1985; Deonna et al. 2012). Enligt detta synsätt spelar identiteten en avgörande roll för skamkänslan. Skam, så lyder huvudtesen, är vad vi känner när vi erfar att vi misslyckats med att leva upp till de värden och ideal som utgör vår identitet. I linje härmed har skam också beskrivits som en beskyddare av självet (jfr Scheler 1913; Taylor 1985). Tanken är att vår skamkänsla håller oss tillbaka från att göra saker som skulle underminera vårt själv och vår identitet.

Jag har under de senaste åren utvecklat en analys av skam som en social känsla som är rotad i vårt mänskliga begär efter socialt erkännande och som konstitueras av vår förmåga till social självmedvetenhet (alltså vår förmåga att se oss själva med andras ögon). Skam är den emotionellt omskakande erfarenheten av vårt eget jag som socialt ovärdigt.

Men om skam är social känsla, vilken roll spelar då vår identitet i skammen?

Mitt förslag är att begäret efter erkännande motiverar och laddar olika dimensioner av vår identitet, och att detta förklarar varför vår identitet starkt tenderar att påverka vad vi känner skam över.

Jag skiljer mellan två aspekter av vår identitet: persona och jagideal. Vårt begär efter erkännande driver oss att presentera oss själva som socialt värdefulla inför andra. Vår persona omfattar både våra offentliga roller och den offentliga image vi visar upp. Jagidealet är däremot vår idealbild av oss själva som socialt värdefulla – som den person vi hoppas vara bortom våra dagliga framträdanden inför andra. Både vår persona och vårt jagideal utövar ett normativt tryck på oss och vi känner att vi måste leva upp till dem för att inte ramla ner i den skamframkallande erfarenheten av oss själva som socialt ovärdiga.

Jag argumenterar för att persona och jagideal är kopplade till olika typer av skam. Att inte kunna leva upp till sin persona är en stark källa till den typ av social skam vi känner när vi blir bedömda av andra verkliga personer. Att misslyckas med att leva upp till sitt jagideal är däremot en viktig orsak till den typ av personlig skam som vi kan uppleva oavsett om någon annan bevittnar vårt misslyckande. Även om det i fråga om personlig skam är vi själva som bedömer våra handlingar och egenskaper utifrån de värden som tillhör vårt jagideal hämtar jagidealet ändå sin affektiva laddning från vårt bekräftelsebegär.

Den här typen av analys väcker också nya frågor om den moralisk-existentiella halten i de identiteter som spelar en central bestämmande roll för skamkänslan. I föredraget tar jag några trevande steg mot att öppna upp frågor som dessa: Utgör vår persona eller vårt jagideal kärnan i vårt jag? Bör vi likställa förverkligandet av dessa aspekter av vår identitet med autentisk självvaro? Eller kan dylika identiteter – genom det normativa och affektiva tryck de utövar på oss såsom medel för att uppnå erkännande – hindra oss från att öppet förverkliga och uttrycka det vi finner viktigt, djupt, gott i oss själva?